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RECONCILING THE SUPREME COURT'S FOUR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
Steven G. Gey*
It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is a mess-both hopelessly confused and deeply
contradictory. On a purely doctrinal level, the Court cannot even set-
tle on one standard to apply in all Establishment Clause cases. At
some point during the last ten years, one or more of the nine justices
have articulated ten different Establishment Clause standards. Many
of the Justices have endorsed several different-and often conflict-
ing-constitutional standards. Justice O'Connor alone authored or
signed opinions that relied on five different (and again, often con-
tradictory) standards for enforcing the Establishment Clause.
The situation is even more confused at the theoretical level. In
cases involving verbal and symbolic governmental endorsement of re-
ligion, the Court has not moved noticeably from the separationist
theory that the Court first staked out in the 1940s and reinforced in
the school prayer decisions in the 1960s.' Aside from brief deviations
to approve the hiring of legislative chaplains, s the state promotion of
secularized Christmas displays, and a longstanding Ten Command-
ments display,' the Court has been remarkably steadfast in resisting
attempts by government officials to advance religion symbolically or
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See infra notes 11-157 and accompanying text.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("Under [the First] Amendment's prohibi-
tion against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to pre-
scribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying
on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Nei-
ther can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance.").
3 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (approving the Nebraska legislature's
hiring of a legislative chaplain).
4 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (approving a Pawtucket, Rhode Island
holiday display that included a Nativity scene along with several secular holiday objects).
5 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005) (approving a forty-year-old monu-
ment on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol).
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verbally. Especially when the symbolic or verbal endorsement occurs
in a public school, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the no-
establishment command means literally no establishment.
In other types of Establishment Clause cases, however, the Court
has essentially abandoned any effort to separate church and state. In
its recent school-funding decisions, the Court has announced that the
Constitution permits substantial infusions of government money into
overtly religious private education and sectarian social services.' The
Court has constructed various diaphanous screens to mask the trans-
fer of funds, but as a matter of economic reality, the Court has re-
nounced Madison's axiom that religious liberty is violated when the
government "can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment." These recent fi-
nancing cases are infused with the spirit of what Chief Justice Burger
used to call "benevolent neutrality '8 and directly contradict the
Court's assertion fifty years earlier that "[n] o tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions."9 On the other hand, this embrace of sectarian favoritism has
been made more complicated recently by the Court's apparent will-
ingness to permit states to embrace policies regarding church/state
financing that are significantly more separationist than what the Es-
tablishment Clause now requires.' ° These contrasting rulings may
portend the Court's adoption of federal constitutional rules that
largely deconstitutionalize church/state doctrine, leaving religious
and secular groups free to fight it out in the political process of each
state, to determine the extent to which each state's population will
permit government to use its coercive powers of taxation and regula-
tion to support religious institutions.
At the deepest level, these inconsistencies in the Court's
church/state jurisprudence can be attributed to serious internal con-
6 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (rejecting Establishment Clause
challenges to the Cleveland, Ohio school voucher program); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
835-36 (2000) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenges to a federal program providing edu-
cational supplies to religious schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (rejecting a
facial Establishment Clause challenge to the provision of government funds to religious social
services organizations).
7 Everson, 330 U.S. at app. 65-66 (1947) (RufledgeJ., dissenting) (quotingJames Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 3 (1785)).
8 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("Short of [] expressly proscribed gov-
ernmental acts there is room [in the Religion Clauses] for play in the joints productive of a be-
nevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.").
9 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
1o See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a
Washington state statute denying state scholarship money to a university student pursuing a de-
gree in theology).
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flicts over the essential meaning of the Establishment Clause. The
Justices in the middle of the recent church/state controversies on the
Court-that is, the Justices who have taken a separationist stance in
endorsement cases, but then abandoned that position in the financ-
ing cases-have been unwilling or unable to make the most basic de-
termination about the nature of government in the American consti-
tutional system. That determination turns on whether the nature of
government is secular or theocratic. Their failure to resolve this most
basic issue makes it doubtful that the present Court will ever produce
a coherent Establishment Clause doctrine.
After reviewing the problematic Establishment Clause landscape
created by the modern Supreme Court, this Article will turn to the
basic issue concerning the nature of the government created by the
American Constitution. Three premises frame the following discus-
sion. The first premise is that the Court will never be able to articu-
late a coherent body of Establishment Clause doctrine or theory
without first making the crucial choice between a secular and theo-
cratic government. The second premise is that the choice between a
secular and theocratic government will largely settle most doctrinal
and theoretical disputes, because there is no logical half-measure be-
tween these two mutually exclusive political species. Government
cannot be a semi-theocracy. More precisely, it is impossible to logi-
cally structure a semi-theocratic form of government. Aside from a
few necessary restrictions on the means by which a theocracy may
punish or oppress religious dissenters, there is no reason why a con-
stitutional structure that permits government to be a weak theocracy
should not also tolerate a government that is a strong theocracy.
Once the Establishment Clause is interpreted in a way that permits
government to base its policies on specifically religious goals that ad-
vance the cause of a particular religious enterprise, the nature of
those goals and the vigor with which the religious and political major-
ity pursues them should not be a matter of constitutional concern. In
such a system, only an outright mandate that religious dissenters must
worship the majority's particular God in a particular way-which
would violate free exercise and free speech protections-would vio-
late the Constitution.
The third, and final, premise of the following discussion is that
any interpretation of the Establishment Clause that would permit a
mild or strong theocratic government would also contradict the basic
structure of democracy, as set forth in the Constitution. This premise
rests on the assumption that the governmental structure described in
the American Constitution is derived from certain basic notions of
democracy, among which are the demands that all power be both
temporal and temporary. A properly democratic government must
therefore be defined by both political and religious agnosticism-a
renunciation of the idea that any political majority is permitted to de-
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fine and enforce any set of absolute political or religious truths. Ac-
cording to this theory, a system of theocratic majoritarianism is not
only contrary to the basic themes set forth in the Establishment
Clause and the Bill of Rights, but is also contrary to the basic theo-
retical requisites of any proper constitutional democracy.
I. TEN STANDARDS IN SEARCH OF AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Current Establishment Clause doctrine and theory is a hopeless
muddle at every level of analysis. From a doctrinal standpoint, the
modem Court's approach to the Establishment Clause fails to meet
even the most mundane requirement of doctrinal clarity. From a
theoretical standpoint, the Court has failed to achieve even a rudi-
mentary level of consistency in its First Amendment pronouncements
regarding church and state. Lower court judges often cannot even
determine which standard the Supreme Court's current majority
wants them to apply, because presently, a majority of the Court can-
not settle on one standard that should apply in all Establishment
Clause cases. At one point or another in recent years, one or more of
the nine Justices have signed opinions proposing ten different stan-
dards for enforcing the Establishment Clause. Thus, the lower
courts are frequently forced to apply several different constitutional
standards, while pretending that each of the chosen standards magi-
cally produces the same constitutional result.2
It would be bad enough if the Justices simply could not agree
among themselves about which test to use in adjudicating Establish-
ment Clause cases, but this unsatisfactory state of affairs is made even
worse by the fact that some Justices seem to be personally conflicted
about which standard they prefer. In recent years, Justice O'Connor
was the worst offender in this respect. She either authored or joined
opinions embracing no fewer than six different Establishment Clause
1 For a discussion of the ten different standards, see infra notes 22-157 and accompanying
text.
12 See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370-76 (4th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests to strike down supper prayer at a state-operated military col-
lege); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 410-19, 423 (2d Cir. 2001)
(applying the Lemon, endorsement, coercion, and neutrality tests, and holding that the Estab-
lishment Clause would be violated if a government facility incorporated the religiously-based
Alcoholics Anonymous treatment plan); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 473
(5th Cir. 2001) (remanding for the factual assessment of a public school's clergy-in-school pro-
gram, after applying the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish
Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking down an anti-evolution disclaimer
read to students before the teaching of evolution in public schools, after applying the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests; noting that the court's "multi-test analysis in past cases has
resulted from an Establishment Clause jurisprudence rife with confusion"); Turner v. Hickman,
342 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893, 894 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (discussing various tests and the situations in
which they apply and/or overlap).
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standards'-"-including one opinion in which she argued that there
should be no consistent standard at all.14 Justice O'Connor has not
been alone in sending mixed signals, however. Justice Kennedy has-
embraced four different Establishment Clause standards. 15 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist embraced three standards, although his list of doc-
trinal preferences was somewhat different than Justice Kennedy's and
very different than Justice O'Connor's.6  And with Justice
O'Connor's departure from the Court, Justice Breyer may have taken
up the mantle of the Justice most conflicted about the Establishment
Clause's meaning. 7 The disagreement among these Justices would
not necessarily be a problem, except that the votes in Establishment
Clause cases are now very close, and one of these Justices usually pro-
vides the majority's winning margin. To cite just one area of frequent
Establishment Clause litigation, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Rehnquist provided three of the five votes for the majority in recent
decisions upholding government financing of private religious
schools.' In contrast, two of these Justices provided the winning
margin in votes to strike down various manifestations of public school
13 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 670 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (ap-
plying a neutrality analysis); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000) (joining
Justice Stevens' majority opinion, which applies the Lemon analysis); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 609 (1992) (joining Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, which applies a broad coercion
analysis); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying an
endorsement analysis); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (joining ChiefJustice Bur-
ger's majority opinion, which relies on a historical analysis, under which the actions of the First
Congress are used to determine the constitutionality of similar actions by modem legislative
bodies).
14 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Court should abandon the effort to articulate one standard for Es-
tablishment Clause cases in favor of an ad hoc approach that turns on the factual circumstances
of each case).
15 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63 (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion based on a for-
mal neutrality standard); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314 (2000) (joining Justice Stevens' majority
opinion applying the Lemon analysis); Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-99 (authoring the majority opinion
in which he applied a broad coercion analysis); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying a narrow coercion
analysis).
16 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651-52 (2002) (arguing in favor of a formal neutrality analysis);
Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (joining Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion and arguing in favor of a narrow
coercion analysis); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing in favor of a nonpreferential standard, under which the government can establish religion
generally, as long as it refrains from establishing a particular church).
17 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
the Court should abandon the effort to define a consistent analysis for Establishment Clause
cases, in favor of an ad hoc analysis to pursue general goals of disestablishment).
18 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63 (upholding a Cleveland school voucher program); Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 240 (1997) (upholding a government program providing remedial edu-
cation services to religious schools).
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prayer activities, such as graduation ceremonies and football games.1 9
Justice Breyer alone was responsible for distinguishing between one
Ten Commandments display and another. 20 The lower courts may be
forgiven for wondering what they are supposed to make of this mess.
Many of them have simply given up in trying to identify one standard
to follow in Establishment Clause cases, in favor of applying a random
sampling of standards from the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause church/state smorgasbord.'
The situation is actually far worse than this brief description indi-
cates, because several of the ten standards currently commanding
support on the Supreme Court mean different things to differentJus-
tices. Some of the more prominent standards have been so twisted
and manipulated over the years to fit the Supreme Court's shifting
ideological center of gravity that they may now be susceptible to vir-
tually any meaning-which is another way of saying that they do not
mean anything at all.22 The unfortunate reality is that the Court can-
not settle on one standard (or a definitive meaning of one standard),
because members of the Court are deeply conflicted about what any
of these standards are supposed to achieve. This internal conflict
over purposes and objectives is reflected in a constitutional doctrine
that more often resembles a Rorschach test than a definitive legal
analysis.
The simplest way to illustrate the sad state of current Establish-
ment Clause doctrine is to review the range of standards competing
for influence within the Court. Even the most cursory review of how
the Court has applied and explained these standards will reveal the
fissures within the Court as a whole and the conflicting inclinations of
individual Justices regarding the proper relationship of religion and
government within the American constitutional scheme. After re-
viewing the various Establishment Clause standards, the next Section
will turn to the even deeper underlying conflicts within the Court
over the basic theory of church and state.
A. The Lemon Test
No review of Establishment Clause standards could proceed with-
out first addressing the much-maligned three-part test first an-
19 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (barring prayers during public high school football games);
Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (ending a practice of prayer before a public high school graduation).
20 See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2872 (Breyer, J., concurring) (voting to uphold the display);
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005) (joining the majority in striking down
the display).
21 See supra note 12.
22 The notorious Lemon test is the best example of this phenomenon. See infra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:4
Aug. 2006] RECONCILING THE FOUR ESTABI1SHMENT CLA USES 731
nounced in Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 s In this 1971 decision, Chief Justice
Burger introduced the test by noting that "over many years" the
Court had developed several "cumulative criteria" for assessing com-
pliance with the Establishment Clause.24 Chief Justice Burger singled
out three such "cumulative criteria" as especially important: "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.' 2 5  These three factors became
known as the Lemon test, which has been the primary focus of virtually
all of the Court's subsequent Establishment Clause decisions.
Two of the three components of the Lemon test had been part of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence for almost a decade prior to
Lemon. Notwithstanding the ancestry and longevity of the Lemon cri-
teria, conservatives inside and outside the Court have been both urg-
ing and predicting the demise of the Lemon test almost since the test's
inception. 7 Even the test's author seemed ambivalent about his crea-
tion. Almost immediately after he announced the test, Chief Justice
Burger began diminishing its importance, arguing at one point that
all Establishment Clause standards "should rather be viewed as guide-
lines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the
Religion Clauses have been impaired., 28 ChiefJustice Burger went on
to cite Lemon for the proposition that "candor compels the acknowl-
edgement that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permis-
sible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adju-
dication., 29  Other Justices have expressed an even more intense
aversion to Lemon. Then-Justice Rehnquist once rejected the Lemon
test on the ground that it "has no basis in the history of the [First]
[A] mendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields un-
principled results."3 0  Justice Scalia has also repeatedly ridiculed
23 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24 Id. at 612.
25 Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
26 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (applying the secular purpose and ef-
fect tests).
27 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644-45 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (KennedyJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting); Phillip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-34 (1992); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795 (1993).
28 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
29 Id.
30 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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Lemon and once provided perhaps the most grandiloquent expression
of the conservatives' derisive sentiments about that opinion: "Like
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once aain,
frightening the little children and school [board] attorneys ....
There are multiple levels of irony in the vociferous opposition to
Lemon among the Court's conservatives. After all, one of the Court's
most conservative members authored the opinion that gave us the
Lemon test, and Chief Justice Burger's ideological descendants have
had no problem co-opting Lemon for their own distinctly nonsepara-
tionist objectives. In Agostini v. Felton,32 for example, the conservatives
abandoned the third (no entanglement) prong of the Lemon test by
subsuming it into the secular effect analysis.33 In Zelman, the same
faction on the Court went even further and simply reduced the entire
Lemon test to a broad neutrality requirement.34 Two years earlier, the
implications of this approach were made clear when four of the con-
servatives voted in Mitchell v. Helmsn5 to uphold direct allocations of
government money to pervasively religious schools-even if the
schools openly divert the government funds to finance their distinctly
religious activities. 36 Given the ease with which the Lemon test can be
manipulated to serve almost any purpose, perhaps Justice Scalia is
correct in noting that "[t]he secret of the Lemon test's survival, I
think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audi-
ence) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to
the tomb at will. 3 7 But if that is the case, then what explains the his-
toric (and injustice Scalia's case, histrionic) resistance to an infinitely
malleable opinion?
One suspects that the desire expressed frequently by Justice Scalia
and others on the Court to kill off Lemon once and for all reflects
31 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia,J.,
concurring).
32 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
33 Id. at 222-23.
536 U.S. 639, 649-52 (2002) (citing the truncated Agostini version of the Lemon test, re-
viewing various cases that applied Lemon, and concluding that these decisions "make clear that
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance
directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause").
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Id. at 824 (arguing that the Establishment Clause is not concerned with the divertibility of
funds); Id. at 827-28 (arguing that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the government
from funding pervasively sectarian schools).
37 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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their recognition that something in Lemon is inherently hostile to the
cause of comprehensively integrating church and state. There are
two aspects of Lemon that may lead them to this conclusion. First, the
general tenor of the Lemon test distresses conservatives because the
tenor of the Lemon test is unmistakably secular and separationist. The
requirement that all government policies must have a nonreligious
purpose and effect can only be explained by reference to an overrid-
ing theme that the government must be comprehensively secular.
And the best explanation for the prohibition on government entan-
glement with religion is the normative conclusion that religion
should be entirely a private matter and that religion and government
should keep their distance from each other.
These principles permeate Lemon, no matter how imperfectly the
Court has applied the test, and the deeply secularist overtones of
Lemon unsettle those on the Court who would have the government
acknowledge and reflect the political majority's religiosity. Although
this faction on the Court has temporarily reached a concordat with
the legacy of Lemon, members of this faction will never be completely
at ease with the principles reflected in Lemon. Rejecting Lemon out-
right would, however, require the Court to explain why sectarian leg-
islation is compatible with a constitutional ban on religious estab-
lishment. If a religious majority may use its political power to impose
its sectarian values on the religious minority, then what is left of the
constitutional command that the government avoid any actions "re-
specting an establishment of religion"? Since the critical fifth mem-
ber of the Court's conservative bloc has not yet come to terms with
this conclusion (a subject that will be addressed in Section II, infra),
for the immediate future the Court's majority will hold Lemon hos-
tage, but will refrain from executing it.
The second aspect of Lemon, the secular purpose requirement,
makes conservatives nervous in two different respects. First, as noted
in the previous paragraph, conservative opponents of Lemon do not
like being told that those who run the government have no authority
to use their political power to advance their religious objectives. This
branch of sectarian opposition to Lemon perceives itself to be the vic-
tim of an antidemocratic purge of religious believers from govern-
ment. The rhetoric used to explain this perspective thus frequently
conflates limitations on the exercise of power with the total exclusion
from power. In Richard John Neuhaus's rendition of this point, he
argues that "we have in recent decades systematically excluded from
policy consideration the operatives [sic] values of the American peo-
ple, values that are overwhelmingly grounded in religious belief.,38
38 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 37 (2d ed. 1984).
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Although this position probably has a certain political appeal in help-
ing to rouse feelings of victimization among those who would have
the government behave in sectarian ways, these feelings are to a large
extent both inaccurate and unjustified.
The sectarian perception of victimization is inaccurate because
prohibiting a political faction from exercising unfettered power does
not deny that faction access to the same constitutional authority ex-
ercised by their opponents. To cite an unflattering analogy, Strom
Thurmond and his sympathizers constitutionally were prohibited
from enacting segregationist legislation after the Supreme Court de-
cided Brown v. Board of Education,39 but they were not ejected from the
United States Senate or otherwise prohibited from exercising politi-
cal power. Similarly, the Establishment Clause does not bar evangeli-
cal Christians from office, it simply prohibits evangelical Christians
from using the government to support or endorse their church. This
is how a system of limited constitutional government works. Certain
matters are taken off the political table-or "excluded from policy
consideration," to use Neuhaus's terms-in order to ensure that mul-
tiple different political, social, and cultural factions can coexist
peacefully. The cultural and political majority's consolation for con-
ceding total political power is that all religious factions are protected
to the same extent. The same limitations that inhibit evangelical
Christians also protect them against legislation incorporating the
views of other religious sects or, for that matter, atheists.
The claim that religious practitioners are victimized is not only in-
accurate; it is also unjustified. There is no empirical support for the
proposition that strong Establishment Clause protection against sec-
tarian government action has led to the exclusion of religious believ-
ers from achieving high political office or prevented believers from
defending their religious ideals once they get there. No one observ-
ing, for example, the ostentatiously pious political response to the re-
cent controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance 4° would think that reli-
gious proponents are inadequately represented in the nation's
centers of political power.
However overwrought these responses to the Lemon secular pur-
pose requirement may be, at least they forthrightly acknowledge that
opposition to the secular purpose requirement is based on opposi-
39 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40 After a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel held that the inclusion of the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause, the United States Senate
voted 99-0 in favor of a resolution denouncing the court and instructing Senate lawyers to file a
brief seeking reversal of the court of appeals. See 148 CONG. REC. S6105-06 (2002) (listing the
votes in favor of S. Res. 292, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted)). The House of Representatives
passed a similar resolution by a vote of 416-3. See 148 CONG. REC. H4135 (2002) (detailing the
results of the vote on H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted)).
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tion to the entire notion of secular government. A second set of re-
sponses to the secular purpose requirement, however, seems to be
based on the desire to cloak religiously based legislation in a thin
secular guise. The secular purpose requirement is problematic from
this perspective on sectarian governance because the secular purpose
requirement gives the Court a mechanism with which to reject du-
plicitous governmental efforts to advance religion.
The Court's prohibition of government efforts to inject the reli-
gious doctrine of creationism into public school classrooms provides
the best example of how the Court can use the first Lemon prong to
prevent the government from surreptitiously advancing a sectarian
agenda.1 In Edwards v. Aguillard, the most recent of the Court's crea-
tionism cases, the Court reviewed a Louisiana statute requiring state
public school teachers to teach "creation science" whenever they
taught evolution.42 The legislature defended this legislation as serv-
ing the legitimate secular purpose of protecting academic freedom.43
The Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that "[w]hile the
Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation of a secular
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere
and not a sham."4 After analyzing the religious background of the
controversy between evolution and creationism 45 and reviewing the
preferences for religion embedded in the Louisiana legislative his-
tory,46 the Court concluded that the Louisiana statute was "designed
either to promote the theory of creation science which embodies a
particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught
whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific
theory disfavored by certain religious sects.
47
In his dissent, Justice Scalia responded to the majority's conclu-
sion by attacking the standard that gave the Court the authority to re-
view the legislature's purpose at all: "Our cases interpreting and ap-
plying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment
Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can
only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional., 48 Justice Scalia
41 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that a Louisiana statute re-
quiring public school teachers to teach creationism violated the Establishment Clause);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas "anti-evolution" statute that
forbade public school teachers from teaching evolution).
42 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (1982) (forbid-
ding the teaching of evolution in public schools that do not teach creationism as well)).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 586-87.
45 See id. at 590-91 (discussing religious antagonism toward evolution).
46 See id. at 587-89 (chronicling legislators' attempts to prevent the teaching of evolution in
public schools).
47 Id. at 593.
48 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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argued that the Court should abandon the Lemon secular purpose
prong and simply take the legislature's stated purpose at face value.
Thus, he concluded that the Louisiana legislature is entitled "to have
whatever scientific evidence there may be against evolution presented
in their schools, '50 even if the "scientific evidence" is little more than
a faith-based theory that is devoid of empirical support and is over-
whelmingly rejected by mainstream scientists. From Justice Scalia's
perspective, the notion that a Supreme Being created the world in es-
sentially its present form should be construed as a secular scientific
conclusion, simply because the legislature said so.
Justice Scalia has joined the recent efforts of other conservatives
to retain the Lemon test but subsume it into a broad and lenient neu-
trality analysis.5 ' One suspects, however, that at the first opportunity,
Justice Scalia would happily return to his previous stance and re-12
nounce Lemon once and for all. In any event, even if Lemon is never
formally interred, future generations of sectarian Justices can pretty
much do what they want anyway. Justice Scalia's scientific under-
standing may be lacking, 3 but he is correct to note that Lemon has al-
ways been notoriously pliable. Even a brief perusal of the Court's
pre-Zelman school financing decisions will reveal the ease with which
Lemon can be translated into both the proposition X and its polar op-
posite.54 This flexibility should not be viewed as a flaw inherent in the
Lemon test itself. In contrast to the views expressed by Justice Scalia
and other like-minded critics, Lemon could be an effective tool in en-
forcing the Establishment Clause, especially if its terms were bol-
stered by something like the "least religious means" analysis once
49 See id. at 639 ("Given the many hazards involved in assessing the subjective intent of gov-
ernmental decisionmakers, the first prong of Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the
Establishment Clause demands it. That is surely not the case.").
50 Id. at 634.
51 See infra notes 95-112 and the accompanying text.
52 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2751 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to the "brain-spun 'Lemon test,'" and arguing that a majority of the Court has repudiated
the test).
5 See generally Stephen Jay Gould, Justice Scalia's Misunderstanding, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 1
(1988) (detailing Justice Scalia's scientific misconceptions).
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (applying Lemon to uphold a government pro-
gram providing government funds to purchase educational materials such as computers for pri-
vate religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (applying
Lemon to uphold a program providing state-financed sign language interpreters to students at-
tending religious schools); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (applying Lemon to prohibit
teachers employed by public schools from conducting "enrichment" classes in private schools);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (applying Lemon to prohibit state use of federal education
grants to finance remedial instruction at private schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (applying Lemon to prohibit the state from loaning secular teaching materials to parents
of children in religious schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (applying Lemon to
prohibit the state from providing instructional materials and auxiliary services to private
schools).
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suggested by Justice Brennan.5 5 But this assumes that the Court is se-
rious about enforcing a coherent view of the secular governance
mandate at the heart of a properly interpreted Establishment Clause.
Without such a theory, Lemon will never mean anything more or less
than what each new beholder wants it to mean. This conclusion does
not, alas, distinguish Lemon from the various alternatives competing
to be deemed the dominant Establishment Clause standard.
B. The Endorsement Analysis
For many years, Justice O'Connor viewed the first two Lemon fac-
tors through the prism of an endorsement analysis. According to this
analysis, the first two Lemon factors turn on "whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion... [and]
whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disap-
proval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the
challenged practice invalid."5 6 Justice O'Connor applied this test in a
range of different contexts, including constitutional challenges to
public school prayer, 7 government religious displays at holidays,58
private religious displays on public land, 59 and the Pledge of Alle-
giance.
60
Although at first glance the endorsement analysis seems like little
more than a narrowing of the traditional Lemon focus, the impetus of
the endorsement analysis provides a conceptual footing that the
Court has never fully provided for Lemon itself. In one of her early
opinions explaining the endorsement analysis, Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that the prohibition of governmental endorsement is im-
portant because "[eJndorsement sends a message to nonadherents
55 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (asserting
that the Establishment Clause is violated whenever the government uses "essentially religious
means to serve government ends, where secular means would suffice").
5 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57 See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that
an Alabama silent meditation statute had the unconstitutional purpose and effect of endorsing
school prayer).
58 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-32 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the placement of a Nativity scene at a county
courthouse violated the Establishment Clause, but a city display of a menorah, Christmas tree,
and sign saluting liberty did not); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor,J, concurring) (explaining
that a city display of a Nativity scene was not intended as an endorsement of Christianity).
59 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the state's tolerance of a Ku Klux Klan display of crosses did not
constitute government endorsement of religion).
W Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O'ConnorJ, concurring)
(arguing that the phrase "under God" contained within the Pledge of Allegiance constitutes
ceremonial deism that does not violate the First Amendment).
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that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the
opposite message. These messages of inclusion and exclusion are
problematic from a political standpoint because they impermissibly
"make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community. ''62 These statements of separationist princi-
ple nicely encapsulate the structural function of the Establishment
Clause, which is designed to divorce political participation from relig-
ion. The prohibition of establishment puts everyone on an equal po-
litical footing, regardless of their idiosyncratic religious beliefs or lack
of belief and prevents the poisonous Bosnian-style joinder of piety
and power. Justice O'Connor's explanation of her endorsement
analysis provided a rare articulation of this structural reality.
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor's application of the endorse-
ment analysis never lived up to the theory's promise. There are sev-
eral reasons for this. First, for all her apparent sensitivity to a relig-
iously exclusive politics, Justice O'Connor often seemed only half-
heartedly in favor of separating church and state. In the holiday dis-
play cases, for example, she indicated that she had no problem with
permitting the government to celebrate religion publicly.63 In the
Pledge case, she dismissed the seriousness of complaints by religious
dissenters about expressions of faith by the government. And in the
Cleveland school voucher case, she failed even to mention the issue
of endorsement, much less question how the endorsement analysis
would apply to government programs funneling millions of tax dol-
lars to private religious education.65
The second reason Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis
failed to solve the problems presented by the Establishment Clause is
that the mechanism Justice O'Connor devised for ascertaining en-
dorsement is seriously flawed. Justice O'Connor suggested that the
endorsement analysis should be assessed through the eyes of "a rea-
sonable observer [who] evaluates whether a challenged governmental
practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion. ''66 According
61 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'CornorJ., concurring).
62 Id. at 692.
6 See id. at 693 (holding that a city's display of a Christmas crche "does not have the effect
of communicating endorsement of Christianity").
64 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (dismissing the reference to God
in the Pledge of Allegiance as "a minimal reference to religion").
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663-76 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that a Cleveland school voucher program was consistent with the Establishment Clause
because it provided nonreligious as well as religious options).
66 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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to Justice O'Connor, this observer should be "deemed more in-
formed than the casual passerby' 67 and must be deemed aware of
both the general and specific history of the community and the fo-
rum in which the Establishment Clause dispute arises. 68 The problem
with the reasonable observer mechanism is that the observer will
never be truly objective. The results a judge obtains from applying
the reasonable observer analysis therefore will depend entirely on
what background knowledge and cultural assumptions the judge
feeds to the observer.69
The malleability of the endorsement analysis is compounded by its
context-specific focus. Even though the addition of the "reasonable
observer" introduces an unfortunate level of uncertainty into the en-
dorsement analysis, it is at least relatively simple to understand the
point of limiting the government's active endorsement of religion in
cases involving school prayer, holiday displays, and other forms of
governmental symbolism. It is much more difficult to ascertain the
point of endorsement in financing cases such as Mitchell and Zelman.
In those cases, the violation of religious liberty goes beyond mere
symbolism. In the financing cases, the government is not only ac-
tively touting the virtues of one religion over another; it is also using
its coercive taxing authority to force one person to support another
person's faith.
Applying a constitutional standard that focuses on limiting en-
dorsement therefore cannot fully account for the problems that arise
when government finances religion. Indeed, the endorsement stan-
dard actually makes matters worse by forcing judges to assess the mes-
sage being communicated by the straightforward act of writing a gov-
ernment check to a church. This search for a message, in turn, allows
judges inclined to uphold the financing scheme to muddy the waters
by diverting the attention of the "reasonable observer" from the con-
crete reality of cash transfers, to matters of ambiance. Thus, in Zel-
man, Justice O'Connor joined the other conservatives in upholding a
multi-million dollar government program to finance religious educa-
tion under a "neutral" funding format. 7° In effect, the symbolic mes-
sage of neutrality drowned out the concrete reality that the govern-
ment was financing overtly religious activity.
This suggests that a test that focuses on coercion may be more
protective of the religious liberties of dissenters than the ostensibly
67 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
68 Id. at 780.
69 Compare the results Justice O'Connor obtains from her reasonable observer analysis, for
example, id. at 779-82, to the conclusions that Justice Stevens draws from his analysis, id. at
797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
protective endorsement analysis. But as the next subsection will illus-
trate, in many ways the coercion analysis is actually less protective of
religious liberty than the endorsement analysis, in that it fails to pro-
vide either a coherent or a consistent approach to enforcing the Es-
tablishment Clause.
C. The Broad Coercion Analysis
For many years, some prominent academic commentators on
church/state issues have favored usin coercion as a dominant motif
in applying the Establishment Clause. Some of the current Justices,
including Justices Kennedy and Scalia, have also periodically advo-
cated this approach. Unfortunately, coercion theory suffers from
many of the same problems that plague Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment theory. Specifically, coercion theory has been (and probably
inevitably will be) interpreted in inconsistent ways, for reasons that
undermine the entire project of using coercion as the standard for
enforcing the Establishment Clause. The underlying problem with
coercion theory is that an intellectually coherent version of the the-
ory produces so few limits on government involvement with religion
that it leaves the Establishment Clause in tatters. If the term "coer-
cion" is used as commonly understood to mean the act of restraining
or dominating by force, then few government actions reasonably can
be described as "coercinq" reluctant individuals to engage in religious
activity against their will. -
The only way of avoiding the unacceptable result of eviscerating
the Establishment Clause is to ameliorate coercion theory by broad-
ening the meaning of "coercion" to the point that even government
inaction in the face of attenuated social pressure is considered un-
constitutionally "coercive." Once coercion theory reaches this point,
it becomes as unclear and unpredictable as other forms of Establish-
ment Clause theory and therefore presents the same kinds of uncer-
tainty problems that coercion theory was intended to resolve. The
choice, therefore, seems to be between a narrow version of coercion
theory, which produces coherent but unacceptable results, or a broad
version of coercion theory, which is incoherent and unpredictable,
71 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Resolving the Conflict,
41 U. PiT. L. REv. 673, 675 (1980) (proposing that the Establishment Clause should only pro-
hibit government action with the purpose of coercing, compromising, or influencing religious
beliefs); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 933, 940 (1986) (rejecting a noncoercion standard as inadequately protective of both reli-
gious "believers" and "nonbelievers"); Paulsen, supra note 27, at 797 (arguing that Lemon has
been replaced by a coercion test).
72 For the specific implications of this version of coercion, see infra notes 83-94 and accom-
panying text.
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but can lead to intuitively acceptable consequences. Proponents of
both forms of coercion theory presently are represented on the
Court, and (not surprisingly) the constitutional results stemming
from the application of coercion theory have differed wildly depend-
ing on which version of coercion theory is used.73
The broad version of coercion theory is the one that has (at least
in one case) garnered the votes of a majority of the Court. This ver-
sion of the theory is deemed "broad coercion" in the sense that it de-
fines the term "coercion" very broadly and therefore prohibits a
broader range of government actions relating to religion. This ver-
sion of coercion theory was used by Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman
to hold unconstitutional a Connecticut public high school's practice
of inviting local clergy to give a brief ecumenical prayer at its official
graduation ceremonies. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that
the graduation prayer was unconstitutionally coercive because the ob-
jecting students' "attendance and participation in the state-sponsored
religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the
school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt
of the diploma.74
Much ofJustice Kennedy's Lee opinion is laudable. The opinion is
especially sensitive to the issues raised by religious disputes in the
public school context. Whatever credence should be given to Justice
Scalia's suggestion that adults who belong to minority religious faiths
should be willing to accept their minority fates quietly,75 this theory
has little merit when applied to juveniles who have not yet developed
either a strong sense of self or social self-defense mechanisms. 76 Jus-
tice Kennedy's analysis, on the other hand, takes these characteristics
into account. Justice Kennedy's opinion is also laudable in its rendi-
tion of the special role the Establishment Clause plays in the First
Amendment. 77 In contrast to the general tenor of the Constitution,
which protects minorities but permits the majority to incorporate its
views into political policy, the Establishment Clause is intended spe-
cifically to prohibit the majority from infusing the public sphere with
its own religious views.78 As Justice Kennedy notes, there are specific
7 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding a public school graduation
prayer unconstitutional under a broad coercion analysis), with id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the prayer clearly is constitutional under a narrow coercion analysis).
74 Id. at 586 (majority opinion).
7.5 See id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Lee majority did not question whether
adults could be forced to sit quietly during government-sponsored religious exercise).
76 See id. at 593-94 (majority opinion) (citing social science literature relating to peer-group
pressure and its relationship to the enforcement of religious orthodoxy).
77 Id. at 590-92 (noting the different mechanisms used by the First Amendment to protect
religion and speech).
78 Id. at 589-90 (noting that the majority is not only prohibited from incorporating its own
sectarian views into law, but also from incorporating a generic version of civic religion).
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historical reasons for barring members of the political majority from
implementing their most cherished sectarian values as public policy,
and the lessons from this history "are as urgent in the modern world
as in the 18th century when [the First Amendment] was written."'79
The flaw in Justice Kennedy's analysis is that none of the Estab-
lishment Clause's values and functions that he discusses have the
slightest thing to do with coercive government activity. All of the
problems Justice Kennedy identifies as arising from the joinder of
government and religion can arise without the government directly
coercing either religious belief or practice. Even in Lee v. Weisman it-
self, it is difficult to characterize the school's obvious Establishment
Clause infraction as having "coerced" Deborah Weisman into engag-
ing in religious behavior against her will. As Justice Scalia repeatedly
points out, all Ms. Weisman had to do was sit in silence while others
prayed.8 0 The coercion with which Justice Kennedy is concerned is
not the sort of direct force used by authoritarian governments to
force unwilling citizens to obey the government's directives. Rather,
Kennedy is concerned with the subtle message of social and political
exclusion communicated by the government's endorsement of reli-
gious values. It is relatively simple to identify truly coercive govern-
mental mechanisms, such as mandatory taxes to support religion and
mandatory church attendance laws. But it is a much more indeter-
minate affair to identify government coercion that is manifested as
the indirect consequences of government action that does not di-
rectly penalize disobedience. Virtually any governmental favoritism
toward religion could be construed as "coercive" in the latter sense,
because all such actions provide intangible benefits to those who
choose the favored faith. But if every government action is poten-
tially "coercive" in this broad sense, then the theory does nothing
more than rephrase other theories such as the endorsement analysis
or Lemon and ends up serving the Establishment Clause's unstated
function in the same imprecise way.
A good indication of the incoherence inherent in the broad coer-
cion analysis can be found in Justice Kennedy's own votes on Estab-
lishment Clause matters. After producing one of the most protective
possible renditions of the coercion standard in his Lee majority opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy then proceeded to join two other opinions that
greatly expanded the extent to which the government could use its
directly coercive taxing and spending authority to finance religious
activity."' This is ironic because government use of tax money to fi-
79 Id. at 592.
so Id. at 638-39 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
81 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the Cleveland school
voucher program, which funneled millions of dollars of government funds into private religious
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nance religious activity has historically been used as the prime exam-
ple of government coercion on behalf of religion. s2 There is no clear
explanation for why one of the Court's most forceful proponents of
coercion theory does not identify the most obvious form of the phe-
nomenon. (Although this fact may provide further evidence for the
proposition discussed in the next Section that the Court's Establish-
ment Clause dilemma these days lies not in its tendency to develop
imperfect standards, but in its inability to settle more basic questions
regarding what the Establishment Clause means). For purposes of
the present discussion of the Court's potpourri of Establishment
Clause standards, Justice Kennedy's inconsistency is merely one of
many indications that the coercion analysis is not the comprehensive
solution to the Court's Establishment Clause malaise that its propo-
nents think it is.
D. The Narrow Coercion Analysis
The second version of the coercion theory can be termed "narrow
coercion," in the sense that it defines the term "coercion" very nar-
rowly and therefore prohibits only the most egregious and overt gov-
ernment actions benefiting or advancing religion. In Justice Scalia's
variation on the narrow coercion theme, he views government actions
as unconstitutional only if they fall within the narrow historical pat-
tern of "coercion of religious orthodoxy and.. . financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty. 8 ' By "coercion of religious ortho-
doxy," Justice Scalia means nothing more than an explicit legal man-
date to join a specific sect or worship the tenets of its faith. He illus-
trates his view of coercion by citing the pre-Revolutionary Virginia
practice under which "ministers were required by law to conform to
the doctrine and rites of the Church of England; and all persons were
required to attend church and observe the Sabbath, were tithed for
the public support of Anglican ministers, and were taxed for the costs
schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a government program under
which government funds were used to purchase educational materials for private religious
schools).
82 Jesse Choper is one of the more prominent academic proponents of coercion theory, and
he has argued that "[wihile public subsidy of religion may not directly influence people's be-
liefs or practices, it plainly coerces taxpayers either to contribute indirectly to their own relig-
ions or, worse, to support sectarian doctrines and causes that are antithetical to their own con-
victions." Choper, supra note 71, at 678. Professor Choper does not follow the implications of
this statement to their logical conclusion, however, because he would generally uphold gov-
ernment voucher plans financing religious schools if the value of the government funds did not
exceed the value of the secular education provided by the sectarian institutions. SeeJesse H.
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260, 265-66 (1968).
83 Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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of building and repairing churches. 84 From Justice Scalia's perspec-
tive, this (and very little else) constitutes impermissible religious co-
ercion.
Unlike some other Establishment Clause standards, the narrow
coercion theory seems at first blush to be generally consistent. But
the theory's consistency is purchased at a very high cost. The narrow
coercion theory of the Establishment Clause would prohibit few, if
any, government actions that would not also run afoul of the Free
Exercise or Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. For exam-
ple, the Free Exercise Clause standing alone presumably would in-
validate a pre-Revolutionary Virginia-styled mandate of church atten-
dance or legal prohibition of non-Episcopalian marriage ceremonies.
In these circumstances, therefore, a narrow coercion interpretation
would essentially render the Establishment Clause redundant.
On the other hand, the narrow coercion theory would not protect
against many abuses that seem inconsistent with our intuitive under-
standing of religious liberty. For example, a narrow coercion theory
would not necessarily prevent a state from enacting a modern version
of Patrick Henry's 1784 "Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of
the Christian Religion" because such a bill would not coerce religious
orthodoxy. As Leonard Levy points out, Henry's Bill:
[D]eclared the "liberal principle" that all Christian sects and denomina-
tions were equal before the law, none preferred over others. It did not
speak of the "established religion" of the state, contained no articles of
faith, and purported to be based on nonreligious considerations only-
the furtherance of public peace and morality rather than Christ's king-
dom on earth or the encouragement of religion. s5
Henry's Bill would have required citizens of Virginia to pay a tithe,
but it would not have required them to support a particular sect iden-
tified by the state, since taxpayers could designate the church to re-
ceive their payment.86 If one were to broaden the scope of the statute
somewhat to encompass non-Christian faiths, then the modern ver-
sion of Henry's statute falls within the permissible scope of narrow
coercion theory. After all, is this hypothetical statute significantly dif-
ferent from the statute in Zelman, in which tax money funded a pro-
gram in which virtually all the recipients of aid attended religious
schools?7 Thus, the narrow coercion theory would seem to accept as
constitutional a slightly modified version of the statute that instigated
84 Id. at 641.
85 LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 54
(1986).
86 1d
87 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647 (2002) (noting that ninety-six percent of
the students receiving money under Cleveland's school voucher program attended religious
schools).
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James Madison to write the "Memorial and Remonstrance" opposing
Henry's Bill, which in turn helped convince the Virginia Legislature
to reject the Bill and adopt, instead, Jefferson's Bill for Religious
Freedom.8 An Establishment Clause theory that leads to the conclu-
sion that Patrick Henry was correct and James Madison was wrong
about the basic requisites of religious liberty is a very strange theory,
indeed.
There are signs that Justice Scalia understands that his standard
falls far short of the public's intuitive understanding of religious lib-
erty-although he may view this as more of a political than a theo-
retical problem. Scalia responds to this problem by falling into the
same inconsistency trap that bedevils the various other standards
proposed by his colleagues. In Lee v. Weisman, for example, Justice
Scalia argues that under his narrow coercion theory, it was not un-
constitutional for the school board to invite a local religious leader to
give a short prayer at a high school graduation ceremony. He even
mocks the notion that any student in the audience would be sub-
jected to religious coercion by this prayer. "[T]he Court's notion
that a student who simply sits in 'respectful silence' during the invo-
cation and benediction (when all others are standing) has somehow
joined-or would somehow be perceived as having joined-in the
,,89prayers is nothing short of ludicrous.
But Scalia is oddly reluctant to say that he would overrule the
Court's classroom prayer or Bible-reading decisions.90 According to
Scalia, those decisions "do not support, much less compel, the
Court's psychojourney[,]" because unlike graduation prayer, class-
room prayer occurred "within a framework in which legal coercion to
attend school (i.e., coercion under threat of penalty) provides the ul-
timate backdrop." 91 But as Scalia himself points out, the legal coer-
cion to attend school did not include legal coercion to recite the offi-
cial prayer or listen to the state-sanctioned Bible passage. In both of
the classroom religion cases, the statutes specifically permitted dis-
sentin students to leave the room while the religious exercises took
place.9 In light of this fact, it is unclear why the general school-
attendance mandate provides the "force of law and threat of pen-
88 See LEVY, supra note 85, at 54-60.
89 Lee, 505 U.S. at 637 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
90 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
91 Lee, 505 U.S. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 207 (stating that "[t]he students and parents are advised that the
student may absent himself from the classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in
the exercises"); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (noting the Regents prayer program "does not require all
pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused
from the room").
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alty''93 required to satisfy Scalia's constitutional standard. In both the
classroom and the graduation settings, the key to the Court's deci-
sions was the fact that the state's action put students in the position of
declaring their dissent publicly and subjecting themselves to the os-
tracism of their peers.
[B]y requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and school-
mates to a profession of disbelief, or at least of nonconformity, the pro-
cedure may well deter those children who do not wish to participate for
any reason based upon the dictates of conscience from exercising an in-
disputably constitutional right to be excused q4
If Scalia accepts this observation as valid in the classroom context,
then why do the Court's similar observations in the graduation case
cause Scalia to berate the Court for embarking on a "psychojourney"?
As suggested above, perhaps the answer to this question is more
political than analytical. Perhaps Justice Scalia understands that re-
versing the classroom prayer and Bible-reading decisions would be
politically difficult. Perhaps Scalia has made the implicit judgment
that the majority of the country would be uncomfortable with state-
authorized prayers being recited daily in public school classrooms
across the land. If so, then this is another way of saying that maybe
Justice Scalia is afraid that a consistent application of the narrow co-
ercion analysis would be revealed as failing to capture the essence of
how the country perceives religious liberty.
E. The Formal Neutrality Analysis
Although the narrow coercion theory would accomplish the goal
of eradicating most vestiges of the separation principle from Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, it is not the only theoretical stratagem
for radically revamping the constitutional law of church and state. In
recent years, the Justices who are inclined to disfavor the separation
of church and state have enjoyed their greatest successes by employ-
ing the concept of formal neutrality. The most important victories
for the formal neutrality analysis have come in the school financing
cases. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris95 and Mitchell v. Helms, 96 a majority
of the Court employed the formal neutrality analysis to overrule sev-
eral older decisions barring government aid to religious schools.
These decisions inaugurated a new era in which governments may
funnel significant amounts of tax funds into religious institutions.
Under this new interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the gov-
93 Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
94 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 289.
95 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
96 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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ernment is constrained by little more than a few simple drafting re-
quirements.
In Zelman, the Court upheld the Cleveland school voucher pro-
gram under which the government provided vouchers to parents who
sent their children to private schools-including religious schools.
The program provided each student with an annual grant of ap-
proximately $2,000.97 In the year preceding the litigation, 3,700 stu-
dents received money to attend private schools.98 Over ninety-six per-
cent of these children attended religious schools. 99 Based on these
numbers, the program involved an annual allocation of several mil-
lion dollars of government funds to religious schools. Nevertheless,
the Court upheld the program based upon an application of a formal
neutrality theory of the Establishment Clause. Under this theory,
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genu-
ine and independent private choice, the pro gram is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause.
1
Two years earlier, the Court decided a case that in many ways in-
volved an even more radical departure from the Court's prior
church/state jurisprudence than did Zelman. In Mitchell, the Court
upheld a program under which government funds were provided to
purchase educational materials, such as computers and other educa-
tional aids. In the Louisiana Parish in which Mitchell arose, the funds
were used to provide a range of materials, including computers, slide
and movie projectors, television sets, globes, and maps."" The pro-
gram provided these materials to both public and private schools.
10 2
Approximately thirty percent of the funds went to private schools;
and in the most recent year considered by the Court, forty-one of the
forty-six private schools participating in the program were religious. 0 3
As in Zelman, formal neutrality was central to the Court's decision
in Mitchell. Four members of the majority relied on a very lenient ver-
97 The actual amount a student received depended on the student's family income. Families
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line received 90% of private school tuition, up to a
total of $2,250. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646. All other students received 75% of private school tui-
tion, up to a total of $1,875. Id.
98 Id. at 647.
99 Id.
'oD Id. at 652.
101 Mitchel4 530 U.S. at 803.
102 The program operated slightly differently with regard to public and private schools. With
regard to public schools, the money was provided directly to the schools, which used the funds
to purchase the educational materials. With regard to private schools, the money was allocated
to a local educational authority, which purchased the educational materials and lent them to
the private schools. Id. at 802-03.
103 Id. at 803.
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sion of formal neutrality as the basis for their decision. According to
the plurality, the program was constitutional "because it determines
eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private
choices of the parents of schoolchildren, and does not provide aid
that has an impermissible content.""4 Thus, to the plurality it did not
matter that the government aid freed up other private funds that
could be used by the religious schools for the religious portion of
their curriculum, nor did it matter that the religious schools diverted
the government-funded equipment to specifically religious activities.
According to the plurality, conforming to formal neutrality insulated
the program from attack even if the government aid was diverted to
religious uses by the schools: "[W] e fail to see how indoctrination by
means of (i.e., diversion of) such [governmental] aid could be attrib-
uted to the government. '"'05
There are two ways of interpreting the Court's formal neutrality
approach in Mitchell and Zelman. The first interpretation is that the
Court devised a scheme that amounts to little more than a framework
of plausible deniability to cloak the constitutionally dubious conse-
quences of certain government funding programs. Under this inter-
pretation, formal neutrality is the fig leaf covering the obvious fact
that the government is diverting a substantial amount of government
aid to finance the sectarian activities of politically powerful religious
groups. This approach allows the Court to effectively abandon the
principle of separation without having to defend its new theory.
Formal neutrality ostensibly preserves the traditional principle that
the government cannot tax one set of religious adherents to support
the religious activities of another, while at the same time it allows the
political majority to satisfy its desire to provide financial aid to reli-
gious organizations. The Court's assertion that the students rather
than the church schools are the true recipients of aid is little more
than hollow pretense; after all, the checks in Zelman and the educa-
tional materials in Mitchell both were provided directly to the reli-
gious schools rather than the students-but at least this fiction main-
tains the theoretical desirability of churches being financially
independent from the government.
Whatever one thinks about the intellectual integrity of the Court's
fig leaf approach, the other possible interpretation of the Court's
move toward formal neutrality is even more disturbing. The second
interpretation assumes that the Court's conservative majority may not
want to preserve even the vestiges of the traditional principle barring
the government from financially supporting religious organizations
and activities, and is moving toward abandoning this principle out-
104 Id. at 829.
105 Id. at 824.
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right. Thus, under this interpretation, formal neutrality is simply the
first step toward implementing the notion that separation of church
and state discriminates against religion by prohibiting the large ma-
jority of religious believers from using "their" government to advance
their religious views. Unfortunately, there is ample justification for
believing that the second interpretation has substantial support on
the Court."°6
The attitude of the Justices who support the concept of formal
neutrality is encapsulated by Justice Thomas's denunciation as "offen-
sive" the Court's historical refusal to finance pervasively sectarian in-
stitutions. °7 Justice Thomas conscripts the imagery of invidious dis-
crimination against religious practitioners to explain his pique: "the
application of the 'pervasively sectarian' factor collides with our deci-
sions that have prohibited governments from discriminating in the
distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or sincer-
ity."108  The equal protection imagery does not fit Justice Thomas's
purpose very well; it is as if Strom Thurmond were to argue that the
Constitution discriminated against whites by prohibiting the white
majority controlling southern state governments from distributing
public benefits to segregationist schools. However ill-fitting the con-
cept of discrimination may be in this context, the use of this language
106 Whether a current majority of the Court supports this position depends on the approach
taken by the two newJustices. While neither ChiefJustice Roberts norJustice Alito had the op-
portunity to speak on precisely this issue while serving as judges on the court of appeals, both of
them expressed views prior to serving on the bench that contribute to the perception that they
will join the other three conservatives on most issues relating to church/state issues. While serv-
ing in the Reagan White House, for example, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a memorandum de-
scribing the opinions in Wallace v. Jafftee, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). In describing Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in that case, Roberts noted that "Rehnquist took a tenuous five-person majority and
tried to revolutionize Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and ended up losing the majority."
John G. Roberts, Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding, June 4, 1985, at 2, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/roberts/Box48-JGR-SchoolPrayerl .pdf.
Roberts then went on to praise Justice Rehnquist's attempt to "revolutionize" the Establishment
Clause jurisprudence by adopting the theory that the government may endorse religions, so
long as it does not endorse a particular sect. "Which is not to say that the effort is misguided.
In the larger scheme of things what is important is not whether this law is upheld or struck
down, but what test is applied." Id. Along the same lines, when Samuel Alito applied for a posi-
tion as deputy assistant attorney general during the Reagan Administration, Alito wrote on his
application that in college he "developed a deep interest in constitutional law, motivated in
large part by disagreement with Warren Court decisions, particularly in the areas of criminal
procedure, the Establishment Clause, and reapportionment." Samuel Alito, Non-Career Ap-
pointment Form, Nov. 15, 1985, at 3, available at http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alitoDOJ.pdf. Al-
though these statements are by no means definitive predictors of their future behavior, nothing
in the laterjudicial opinions, nor statements made at their confirmation hearings, indicate that
either Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito have changed their narrow views of the protections
offered by the Establishment Clause.
107 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
108 Id.
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indicates the depth of frustration felt by the religious majority at its
inability to reap the fruits of its political dominance.
Unfortunately, various members of the Court have begun to ex-
press this same sentiment outside the financing context in cases in-
volving explicit governmental endorsement of religion. Justice Scalia,
for example, has argued in favor of public school prayer (at least in
the context of graduation ceremonies) on the grounds that the Con-
stitution should not be interpreted to prevent members of the public
from 'joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship
and seek." 09 Justice Scalia ignores the fact that the audience at a
modern public school graduation ceremony might also include Hin-
dus and Buddhists, who do not worship a single God; or atheists and
agnostics, who do not worship God at all; orJehovah's Witnesses and
traditional Baptists, who do not believe that the government has any
business attending to their belief in God under any circumstances.
Justice Scalia sees only the religious majority whose members domi-
nate the culture, and who do, in fact, worship and seek the same
God. To him, this is neutrality. A more recent manifestation of the
same phenomenon is Justice Scalia's blunt assertion that the mono-
theistic religious majority can use the government to expressly en-
dorse the central sacred precepts of their faith-and simultaneously
disfavor the contrary precepts of their religious opponents." °
The same religious myopia recently manifested itself in Justice
O'Connor's attempt to justify an overt violation of the governmental
endorsement principles that she supposedly holds dear. Justice
O'Connor argued that the government's insertion of the words "un-
der God" in the official Pledge of Allegiance is constitutional be-
cause, after all, we are a religious country, and the country's official
credo should reflect that fact: "Certain ceremonial references to God
and religion in our Nation are the inevitable consequence of the reli-
gious history that gave birth to our founding principles of liberty.""'
Even assuming that Justice O'Connor got her history right, 12 it is de-
109 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that "the Court's oft repeated assertion that the government cannot favor religious practice
is false").
i Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112 On the matter of ceremonial references to religion, as in most other matters dealing with
the country's religious history, the situation is infinitely more complicated than the opponents
of separation are willing to admit. While it is true that most of the early Presidents included
religious references in their official pronouncements, at least one prominent early figure-
Thomas Jefferson-did not. This was not accidental, as the following famous quote from Jeffer-
son indicates. According to Jefferson,
Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining them an act of discipline. Every
religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the
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batable whether any religious faction should be able to use its histori-
cal domination to justify actions by the government to perpetuate
that domination.
In the end, these "love it or leave it" descriptions of religious cul-
tural domination rob the term "neutrality" of all significance. If the
government can expressly endorse the dominant group's set of reli-
gious principles and use tax money obtained from dissenters to pro-
vide religious training for members of majority faiths, then "formal
neutrality" means simply that neutrality is merely a formality.
F The Substantive Neutrality Analysis
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth vote in both Zelman and
Mitchell. In both cases, however, she contributed separate opinions
detailing her reasons for upholding the programs in question. It is
possible to view these opinions as suggesting that Justice O'Connor
believed that something more than formal neutrality is required to
justify government funding of religious enterprises. Thus, in these
opinions Justice O'Connor can be said to have adopted a kind of sub-
stantive neutrality approach to government funding issues. (Justice
Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's opinion on this score in Mitchell,
which presumably means that some version of this perspective is rep-
resented on the Court even afterJustice O'Connor's departure).
A strong version of substantive neutrality theory has been sug-
gested in the academic literature by Professor Douglas Laycock. In
his version of substantive neutrality, "the religion clauses require gov-
ernment to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or dis-
courages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, obser-
vance or nonobservance. 113  This does not seem to be the sort of
substance Justice O'Connor was speaking of in her Zelman and
Mitchell concurrences. On the other hand, it is difficult to say exactly
what kind of substantive limitation Justice O'Connor was trying to
impose in those cases. Her comments do not suggest any systematic
limitation on the term "neutrality." But then again, it is difficult to
conceive of any serious limitation on the concept that could survive
Justice O'Connor's willingness to advance the implausible proposi-
objects proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this right can
never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 103 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 429 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904)). For a discussion of other conflicting tenden-
cies in the American history of church and state and what those tendencies suggest for constitu-
tional interpretation, see Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers that
History Doesn't Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617.
113 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990).
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tion that infusing government cash into religious schools does not
amount to government aid to religion.
Justice O'Connor had somewhat different concerns with the for-
mal neutrality approach in the indirect and direct aid contexts. In
Mitchell (the direct aid case), Justice O'Connor focused primarily on
the divertibility of the government funds. She objected that the four-
member "plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning
that factor singular importance in the future adjudication of Estab-
lishment Clause challenges to government school aid programs."'14
This is certainly an accurate rendition of the plurality's focus on
"formal neutrality," but it is unclear why the plurality's focus so dis-
pleased Justice O'Connor. Although much of her opinion was de-
voted to detailing the ways in which the plurality's rule permitting
schools to divert government aid to religious purposes would contra-
dict the Court's earlier precedents," 5 Justice O'Connor never shied
away from reaching out to overrule longstanding precedent to make
it easier for governmental aid to reach religious schools.
16
Aside from her concern about divertibility, Justice O'Connor also
argued that direct aid cases should not be considered under the same
standard as indirect aid cases, in which money is funneled to religious
schools through the parents of students attending those schools.
Much of her reasoning in this part of the opinion depended on her
conclusion that a reasonable observer would be more likely to see
evidence of endorsement in a direct aid case. 117 But for purposes of
assessing whether the state is sending a message of endorsement, it is
debatable whether the details of diversion are more important than
the fact that millions of dollars of government money are being spent
to facilitate the enterprise of religious education.
Despite her stated concerns, Justice O'Connor approved the
Mitchell program anyway, based on her conclusion that the Court
should assume that the schools are not misusing government-funded
materials unless there is specific evidence to the contrary."" Even if
her substantive neutrality standard (or the version of the standard
that Justice Breyer may decide to advance) does have some theoreti-
11 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'5 See id. at 838-41.
16 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (illustrating a circumstance in which the Court
uses an extraordinary procedural device to reconsider and overrule twelve-year-old precedent
that had prohibited local governments from sending public school teachers into parochial
schools to provide supplementary educational services). Justice O'Connor authored the major-
ity opinion in that case.
"7 See Mitchel4 530 U.S. at 842-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"1 See id. at 857 ("To establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the aid
in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes."). In the opinion, Justice
O'Connor further states, "presumptions of religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate
when evaluating neutral school aid programs under the Establishment Clause." Id. at 858.
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cal content beyond the plurality's minimally protective formal neu-
trality analysis, therefore, plaintiffs will have a difficult time challeng-
ing the unconstitutional state action. Because Justice O'Connor and
Justice Breyer presume that the recipients of government aid pro-
grams will use the aid in constitutional ways, they effectively foreclose
facial challenges to statutes providing government aid to religious
schools, in favor of cumbersome, expensive, and narrow as-applied
challenges to specific instances of misuse. Under the O'Connor-
Breyer standard, as well as the plurality's, therefore, the basic appara-
tus of state-funded religious education is generally protected from
constitutional attack.
If Justice O'Connor's substantive neutrality proposal added little
to the plurality's formal neutrality approach in direct aid cases such
as Mitchell, it added nothing whatsoever to the majority's analysis in
indirect aid cases such as Zelman. In the indirect aid context, Justice
O'Connor shed whatever qualms she expressed about the formal
neutrality approach in Mitchell. Although she began her Zelman opin-
ion by recognizing that the Cleveland voucher program is "different
from prior indirect aid cases in part because a significant portion of
the funds appropriated for the voucher program reach religious
schools without restrictions on the use of these funds,"" 9 she ap-
proved the program anyway. Justice O'Connor spent most of her
time arguing that although the voucher program benefits religious
private schools almost exclusively, this is irrelevant in light of the fact
that even more significant amounts of government money flow to
other types of educational institutions, such as public schools and
charter schools.2 0 Furthermore, she argued, the money funneled to
the particular type of religious endeavor financed by the voucher
program "pales in comparison to the amount of funds that federal,
state, and local governments already provide religious institutions"
2'
through mechanisms such as tax exemptions. In the end, the key to
Justice O'Connor's approach in the indirect aid cases was the same
formal neutrality standard used by the other four members of the
Zelman majority. If the program is neutral on its face, then as a mat-
ter of substance it does not matter that the government is financing a
significant amount of religious activity.
Whatever promise the O'Connor-Breyer substantive neutrality
theory may represent in the direct aid cases appears to be limited to
119 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 663 (2002) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
120 Id. at 664.
121 Id. at 665.
122 Id. at 672-76 ("1 am persuaded that the Cleveland voucher program affords parents of
eligible children genuine nonreligious options and is consistent with the Establishment
Clause.").
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that context. The standard adds nothing to the few limits that are
imposed by the formal neutrality theory in the indirect aid context.
Thus, substantive neutrality (at least as practiced by the Court's one
current proponent) does little or nothing to stop the slide toward a
massive infusion of public funds into private religious education.
The question (which will be explored in the next Section) is whether
the Court's new majority will take the logic that effectively eviscerates
Establishment Clause limits on state funding of religion and apply
that logic to cases in which the government expressly endorses relig-
ion and uses its power to advance sectarian causes in non-financial
ways.
G. The Nonpreferentialist Analysis
At least some of the current Justices have already arrived at the
destination indicated at the end of the previous subsection. Almost
two decades ago, in Wallace v. Jaffree, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote an
opinion arguing that the Establishment Clause should not be inter-
preted to prohibit "nonpreferential" establishments of religion.
23
New Chief Justice Roberts, who replaced Rehnquist, wrote a memo-
randum while working for the Reagan Administration in which he
seems to have embraced this theory of the Establishment Clause.
12 4
The nonpreferentialist argument specifically contravenes the Court's
longstanding adherence to the proposition that the Justices have "re-
jected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause
forbids only governmental preference of one religion over an-
other." 25 Justice Rehnquist argued that the modern Court's more re-
strictive approach toward governmental establishments ignores the
historically close relationship between church and state, overlooks
the tradition of governmental endorsement of generic religion, and
reads too much significance into Jefferson's "misleading metaphor"
126regarding the wall of separation between church and state.
The Rehnquist opinion in Wallace was based largely on a historical
analysis popular among conservative constitutional scholars during
the late 1970s and early 1980s.127 The argument asserted that the
Framers intended only to prohibit establishments of particular
churches, but not religion in general. This analysis was subjected to
123 See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124 See Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding, supra note 106.
125 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
126 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127 See generally ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1982); MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE
AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the
"No Preference"Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (1986).
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criticism on many different levels.12 " For purposes of reviewing the
constitutional standards currently garnering votes on the Court, how-
ever, the consequences of the nonpreferentialist analysis are more
important than its weak historical support.
The consequences of a constitutional regime governed by the
nonpreferentialist interpretation of the Establishment Clause would
be extensive. The name of the theory itself indicates that the Estab-
lishment Clause would no longer serve as a bar to the incorporation
into law of the majority's general religious views. As Justice
Rehnquist summarized the gist of the theory, "nothing in the Estab-
lishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between
religion and irreligion.' '2 9 Adopting the nonpreferentialist approach
to the Establishment Clause would entail overruling all of the Court's
school prayer decisions, as well as the other decisions in which the
Court prohibited the government from symbolically or verbally en-
dorsing religion. Most of these decisions do not involve the govern-
ment's explicit advancement of a particular sect. In general, the gov-
ernment actions in these cases attempted to be ecumenical, at least
within the tradition of Western (and mostly Christian) faiths. Under
a nonpreferentialist regime, a simple nod toward ecumenism would
be sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause, even if the imple-
mentation of the government program would favor (at least in the
broad outlines) the majority's form of religious exercise. As in the
financing context, an ostensible neutrality process would permit the
government to effectively continue to isolate atheists, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, Hindus, and members of other minority sects. Justice Scalia
has already explicitly embraced just such an exclusionary approach,
arguing that "it is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices
that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists
and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard
of devout atheists."0
3 0
The consequences of adopting a nonpreferentialist stance in the
religious financing area would be less extensive, but only because a
majority of the Court has already effectively adopted the nonprefer-
entialist approach under the aegis of the formal neutrality theory.
Under formal neutrality, as long as all religions are given an equal
opportunity to enjoy the government's largess, then the Establish-
ment Clause is satisfied. But the theory of nonpreferentialism would
not stop there. As Michael McConnell has pointed out, the theory of
128 For a succinct critique, see generally Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). For a longer discussion of
the historical evidence, see generally LEVY, supra note 85.
129 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
130 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nonpreferentialism would permit a range of government schemes
that would entail the direct coercion of religious practice. "It is easy
to imagine forms of nonpreferential aid, short of establishing a na-
tional church, that nonetheless would have the effect of coercing a
religious observance."13' Indeed, the nonpreferentialist approach
would belatedly constitutionalize the system of legally mandated reli-
gious tithes that six states continued to impose during the late eight-
eenth century. As Leonard Levy notes, "[i]n each of the six states
where multiple establishments existed, the establishment included
the churches of every denomination and sect with a sufficient num-
ber of adherents to form a church.' 32 Thus, nonpreferentialism pre-
sents yet another theoretical mechanism to grant Patrick Henry the
victory thatJames Madison denied him over two centuries ago.133
H. The Nonincorporation Analysis
If nonpreferentialism reduces the scope of the Establishment
Clause to the vanishing point, Justice Thomas takes the final step and
eliminates the clause altogether-at least insofar as the clause re-
stricts state and local establishments of religion. Justice Thomas has
become the Court's leading proponent of the nonincorporation the-
sis. In his Newdow concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued:
The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it
is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering
with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which
does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the
Establishment Clause [into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment] .134
This statement reaffirms and elaborates on the position Justice Tho-
mas expressed two years earlier in Zelman, in which he argued that
"the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so
long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other in-
dividual religious liberty interest."135  Presumably, this means that
unless a state imposes civil or criminal sanctions on the worship of a
disfavored religion or the nonworship of a favored religion, the Con-
stitution would permit states to support and explicitly endorse spe-
cific religious sects, base legislation on religious proscriptions, com-
bine religious and political symbolism, and use tax money to finance
selected religious organizations.
131 Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
933, 936 (1986).
132 LEvY, supra note 85, at 61.
133 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
134 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (ThomasJ, concurring).
135 Zehnan v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas,J, concurring).
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As with many of the other interpretations proposed by members
of the Court (on both ends of the Establishment Clause spectrum),
Justice Thomas ascribes to the framers his normative choices about
the scope of the clause. There are many problems with this historical
argument, not least of which is the fact that it does not account for
the change in constitutional scope and structure wrought by the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it is true that the
rights embodied in the Bill of Rights initially only limited the federal
government, 3 6 it is also true that the nature of those rights changed
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically with
regard to the right to be free from establishments of religion, there is
some evidence that the popular conception of establishment changed
during the period between the adoption of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in ways that undermine Justice Thomas's account.1
7
Aside from questions about the historical accuracy and theoretical
depth of Justice Thomas's rendition of the Establishment Clause, the
fact is that the nonincorporation theory proposes the most radical re-
vamping of Establishment Clause theory imaginable. Justice Thomas
proposes somehow to unscramble the eggs of modern constitutional
jurisprudence in order to separate the distinctive components of fed-
eral and state authority over religion. This approach would produce
a political world that no modern American citizen would recognize,
and few would endorse. As with other originalist accounts of the
Constitution (such as Justice Rehnquist's originalistjustification of his
nonpreferential approach to the Establishment Clause 38 ), Justice
Thomas essentially argues that the Court should reject everything
that is familiar to the modern eye and overturn nearly sixty years of
jurisprudence, in order to return to an original position that is
probably mythical anyway.
Interpreting the Establishment Clause as a "federalism provision"
would not, as Justice Thomas asserts, eliminate the rights-protecting
function of the Establishment Clause. 3 9 Rather, this interpretation
would merely change the beneficiaries of the clause's protection.
Under the various Establishment Clause standards that now prevail in
the Court, the federal Constitution protects religious dissenters in re-
ligiously homogeneous states from the majoritarian excesses of pow-
136 Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill
of Rights does not apply directly to state and local governments).
137 See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablish-
ment Principle, 27 ARmz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (discussing the changes in attitude toward the Estab-
lishment Clause during the period between the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138 See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
139 See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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erful local sects. 140 Under the Thomas interpretation, on the other
hand, the federal Constitution would actually protect religious ma-
jorities in the states, allowing them to exercise their political clout
freely. Locally powerful sects would be protected from legal rules
imposed by the more religiously diverse nation as a whole, and would
therefore be free to use their regionally powerful concentrations of
power to form sectarian enclaves in which particular religious views
dominate the political atmosphere and define public life.
Under this approach, we would return to a landscape that would
have been recognizable to American religious dissenters in the late
eighteenth century. In that landscape, individuals could enjoy reli-
gious liberty only by congregating geographically with a critical mass
of others who shared their faith. Of course, it is a much larger coun-
try today than it was during the years of the early Republic, so the op-
portunities for a localized scheme of religious liberty are commensu-
rately greater. Thus, if the Establishment Clause were deemed
inapplicable to state and local governments, evangelical Protestants
could roam freely in the South, Catholics and Jews could find com-
fort in the urban areas of the Northeast, Buddhists could migrate to
certain Asian communities on the West coast, and (as in the early Re-
public) freethinkers could always move to Rhode Island. Even the
smallest minorities could find an enclave. New Agers could have
Main County, California, and Muslims could take Dearborn, Michi-
gan.
This Bosnian view of the Constitution would take some getting
used to. It would probably require a comprehensive educational
campaign to familiarize the public with the odd notion that their
state governments could establish a state church. And it would re-
quire some intellectual juggling to reconcile the enhanced power of
sectarian state governments with the national power to provide statu-
tory protection of the dwindling rights protected by the Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses. If the Establishment Clause were viewed as
a federalism provision, then presumably the interest in sectarian he-
gemony would become part of the burgeoning category of state sov-
140 A recent study of the nation's religious demographics indicates wide variation in the de-
gree of religious domination among the states. See BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION STUDY 42 (2001) (compiling religious identification statistics for
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, excluding Hawaii and Alaska for reasons of cost).
This study reports that fifteen states have populations that identify overwhelmingly (i.e., thirty-
five percent or more) with one sect and have no other sect reporting identification rates within
twenty percentage points of the dominant sect. Id. Other states have a large proportion of re-
lated sects (Protestant Christians, for example), which could easily achieve political dominance
by joining together in a political alliance of convenience in opposition to other, dissimilar sects.
In short, in the absence of the protections offered by the Establishment Clause, there is a very
real prospect that many states will be vulnerable to religious dominance by one or a few sects,
with all the attendant mischief such dominance portends.
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ereignty interests protected by the Court under the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments. Thus, any effort by the federal government to in-
terfere with the states' sovereign interests to pursue their theocratic
goals would be deemed unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores41' al-
ready limits the federal government's power to protect religious lib-
erty in some respects; this new state right to establish religion would
expand these limits exponentially.
The very fact that one or two 4 2 members of the Supreme Court
could seriously propose that the Court should consider adopting the
radical theory of Establishment Clause nonincorporation indicates
how far the Court has come in recent years. These members of the
Court argue vociferously that we should abandon our traditional
Madisonian nervousness about the possibility of sectarian political
fratricide. Their position conveys the certainty and absolute confi-
dence of the righteous. In contrast, whatever criticism can be leveled
at the confusion of the other members of the Court, at least it can be
said on their behalf that they have hesitated before stepping off the
precipice.
L The Divisiveness Analysis
The latest addition to the list of Establishment Clause standards
proposed by one or more current Supreme Court Justices can be la-
beled the divisiveness analysis. This analysis was used by Justice
Breyer in the recent Ten Commandments cases to justify his vote to
uphold the constitutionality of one display while striking down the
other. 14 This was a mildly surprising result. In what would turn out
to be her Establishment Clause swan song, Justice O'Connor chose to
apply her endorsement analysis more rigorously than usual, leaving
Justice Breyer in the unaccustomed role as the critical fifth vote who
determined the different outcomes of two related cases.
It is difficult to say exactly what significance Justice Breyer intends
to ascribe to the divisiveness analysis. Certainly nothing in his opin-
ions in the Ten Commandments cases gives this analysis any system-
atic content, and he specifically disavows the notion that this (or any
other analysis) should be regarded as the determinative factor in Es-
tablishment Clause decisions. Justice Breyer first expressed his con-
cern with religious divisiveness in Zelman, in which he used divisive-
141 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional
because the remedy provided under the statute was not congruent and proportional to evi-
dence of state violations of free exercise rights).
142 Justice Scalia is the other. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissent-
ing) ("The Establishment Clause was adopted to prohibit such an establishment of religion at
the federal level (and to protect state establishments of religion from federal interference).").
143 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (BreyerJ., concurring).
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ness primarily as an explanation for and unifying focus of the Estab-
lishment Clause. According to Justice Breyer:
In a society as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that
we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to protect
against religious strife, particularly when what is at issue is an area as cen-
tral to religious belief as the shaping, through primary education, of the
next generation's minds and spirits.
A few years later, Justice Breyer seems to have elevated the con-
cern with divisiveness to the status of an actual constitutional stan-
dard. As noted, he relied heavily on the element of divisiveness to
distinguish two Ten Commandments displays. After voting to strike
down a Ten Commandments display that had engendered a great
deal of social conflict in a small Kentucky town,'45Justice Breyer then
provided the fifth vote to uphold a similar Ten Commandments dis-
play outside the Texas State Capitol.1 46 Justice Breyerjustified his vote
in the latter case on the ground that "as a practical matter of degree
[the Texas] display is unlikely to prove divisive.
1 47
At one level, the concern with divisiveness is understandable and
even laudable. Division along religious lines is poisonous in a de-
mocracy as diverse as this one, in which members of virtually every
imaginable religious faction must coexist peacefully alongside those
whom they consider sinners and infidels. But even though Justice
Breyer's general concern with divisiveness is unobjectionable, trans-
lating that general concern into an easily applicable legal standard is
another matter. It is unclear, for example, how much religious divi-
siveness Justice Breyer believes is enough to tip the constitutional bal-
ance. Even if Breyer could identify a trigger point for an impermissi-
bly divisive government action, moreover, his standard would
introduce into the Establishment Clause mix an odd set of incentives.
Under Breyer's standard, religious groups would actually be encour-
aged to fight openly about sectarian matters relating to government,
because demonstrating religious division would be the only way to
trigger the application of the Establishment Clause and enlist the
courts' assistance in forestalling the government action. A standard
that encourages religious divisiveness is hardly the sort of standard that
could be relied upon to prevent religious divisiveness.
It also seems that Justice Breyer's divisiveness analysis would be
least useful in situations in which is it most necessary. The Establish-
ment Clause is most necessary in places where the community is the
most religiously homogeneous. In such communities, religious dis-
14 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 725 (2002) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
f45 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005).
146 Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (BreyerJ., concurring).
147 Id. at 2871.
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senters are most likely to be coerced and harassed on religious
grounds, but by virtue of being few in number and overshadowed and
outshouted by the religious majority, such dissenters are unlikely to
muster the magnitude of vociferous opposition to the government's
religious activity that would trigger the concern with religious divi-
siveness. The fact that most people in Texas were perfectly happy to
have their government erect a monument reminding them (among
other things) that "I AM the LORD thy God" and that "Thou shalt
have no other gods before me,' 48 is hardly an answer to Thomas Van
Orden's argument that the religious exercise violated the Establish-
ment Clause. The fact that few dissenters joined Van Orden in ob-
jecting may not, as Justice Breyer argued, indicate that there is no
problem; rather, it may indicate just how large the problem is.
J The Ad Hoc Analysis
Perhaps it was inevitable that some Justice would survey the situa-
tion outlined above and conclude that it is impossible to reconcile
the conflicting strains of Establishment Clause analysis. Given her
tendency to advance several different Establishment Clause theories
at once, it was perhaps also inevitable thatJustice O'Connor would be
the first Justice to acknowledge publicly that she has given up the ef-
fort to find "a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases
that may arise under [the Establishment] Clause." 149 It is not possible
to find a unifying theory, Justice O'Connor argued, because "the
same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different
contexts. ' 5° Thus, she proposed that the Court should resort to an
ad hoc analysis of Establishment Clause cases, under which different
categories of cases would be analyzed under different tests:
If each test covers a narrower and more homogeneous area, the tests may
be more precise and therefore easier to apply. There may be more op-
portunity to pay attention to the specific nuances of each area. There
might also be, I hope, more consensus on each of the narrow tests than
there has been on a broad test.151
Justice O'Connor focused special attention-and criticism-on
the Lemon test. According to Justice O'Connor, by 1994 the Lemon
test had become "so vague as to be useless."'52 In order to make
Lemon work, she argued, the Court had tried to "patch up" Lemon,
148 Id. at 2873 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
149 Bd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
150 Id..
151 Id. at 721.
152 Id. at 718.
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making it "more amorphous and distorted."1 53 It would be far better,
O'Connor concluded, to identify narrower and more precise tests to
fit every area, to avoid the inevitable conflicts that arise when one test
is used for all purposes.154
There are two problems with this analysis. The first is that the fac-
tual predicate for Justice O'Connor's analysis may not be true. The
second is that the solution Justice O'Connor proposed may be worse
than the malady she identified. As for the first problem, it is by no
means clear that the inconsistency in the Court's decisions is attribut-
able to the vagueness and/or inherent inapplicability of Lemon to
some circumstances. Frankly, the terms of Lemon are not especially
vague. As for the first part of Lemon, identifying a nonsecular pur-
pose simply requires a factual investigation into why the government
undertook a particular action. Obviously, the government actors in-
volved may sometimes lie or cloak their real reasons behind sham ra-
tionales, but the difficulty of enforcing a clear standard in the face of
official willingness to act illegally and then lie about it does not con-
stitute proof that the standard itself is flawed. Likewise, applying the
second part of Lemon is in most situations equally easy. Identifying a
secular effect simply requires a clear description of how a challenged
government action actually operates. Certain government actions
produce obvious nonsecular effects, such as government-sponsored
messages that advocate religious principles or government programs
that finance a religious enterprise. Finally, the third part of Lemon-
the no entanglement requirement-simply prohibits extensive gov-
ernment intrusion into the affairs of a religious enterprise. This con-
cept is neither unclear, nor particularly difficult to enforce. If a stat-
ute or regulation requires government employees to spend many
hours coordinating their activities with religious personnel, then it is
a good bet that the government is impermissibly entangled with relig-
ion.
The problems Justice O'Connor identified with the enforcement
of Lemon have nothing to do with the vagueness of the standard. The
problems she identified have more to do with the fact that some of
the Justices (including Justice O'Connor) dislike the results that
would be produced by a consistent application of that standard. A
consistent application of the three-part Lemon test would require the
Court to strike down all government programs that fund or otherwise
contribute to the operation of religious institutions such as parochial
schools. Financing a religious enterprise with government funds-
even indirectly-constitutes a clear-cut religious effect under Lemon,
and (unless the church group is simply provided government funds
153 Id. at 720.
15 Id. at 721.
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with no regulatory supervision) will probably involve such extensive
oversight that the financing scheme will also constitute impermissible
entanglement.
The problem this posed forJustice O'Connor is that this is not the
result she wanted to reach. In the very same opinion in which she
complained about Lemon, she also complained that in previous cases
the Court enforced the Establishment Clause too rigorously in school
aid cases: "The Court should, in a proper case, be prepared to recon-
sider [these previous cases] in order to bring our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track-
government impartiality, not animosity, toward religion. 1 5 5  Three
years after she wrote this opinion, Justice O'Connor would provide
the fifth vote to overturn those earlier decisions. 15 6 In subsequent
years, she would again provide the deciding vote in cases that have
paved the way for broad-scale government financing of religious edu-
cation, as well as other religiously based social services. The results
Justice O'Connor reached in those cases are impossible to reconcile
with Lemon, so to Justice O'Connor (at least in the financing area)
Lemon had to go. But the problem with Lemon is not that it is too
vague; the problem with Lemon is that it is all too clear.
By adopting the ad hoc approach to the Establishment Clause,
Justice O'Connor did not merely allow herself to enjoy the use of
various different constitutional standards; she has actually allowed
herself to create several different Establishment Clauses. Justice
O'Connor assisted a shifting majority of the Court to develop one Es-
tablishment Clause for government symbolic endorsements of relig-
ion, another for government programs financing religion, yet an-
other for state policies that avoid benefiting religious operations, and
so on. The vagueness Justice O'Connor perceived in the Lemon stan-
dard was really a reflection of her own confusion about the proper
purposes of the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, she was not
alone in this confusion. Indeed, just as Justice O'Connor leaves the
Court, Justice Breyer has decided to pick up the cudgel for a stan-
dardless, ad hoc Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In Van Orden,
Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's expressed aversion to a uni-
fied Establishment Clause standard: "While the Court's prior tests
provide useful guideposts... no exact formula can dictate a resolu-
tion to such fact-intensive cases." '57 This willingness to abandon the
effort to define a consistent Establishment Clause standard can be
viewed in one of two ways. On one hand, it can be viewed as its pro-
15 Id. at 717-18.
156 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-40 (overruling previous decisions that had pro-
hibited the government from providing remedial education services to religious schools).
157 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005) (Breyer,J., concurring).
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ponents suggest: as an effort to introduce flexibility and adaptability
into the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. On the other
hand, it can be viewed through the lens suggested below: as an intel-
lectually lazy avoidance of the difficult task of defining the basic rea-
sons we are talking about the Establishment Clause in the first place.
K The Roots of the Establishment Clause Morass
However one feels about any of the standards discussed above, it
should be easy to get consensus on the general proposition that the
Court's effort to define a clear and consistent standard for Establish-
ment Clause cases has been a complete failure. Some combination of
these standards (such as the Lemon, endorsement, broad coercion,
and formal neutrality analyses) can attract the votes of a majority of
the current Justices, at least in some circumstances. Others (such as
the nonpreferentialist and nonincorporation theories) are idiosyn-
cratic and can garner no more than one or two votes (although this
assessment may change as the two new Justices more fully articulate
their views on church/state matters). Even if these idiosyncratic ap-
proaches remain anomalous, however, they cannot be ignored; given
the divisions on the current Court, it may be possible to cobble to-
gether a majority in some cases from groups of Justices taking two or
three different idiosyncratic approaches.
To complicate things even further, some of the Justices change
not just their votes, but their entire constitutional perspective, de-
pending on what type of government action is being challenged. In
many respects, therefore, the factual category into which a particular
Establishment Clause challenge fits is a better predictor of the
Court's response to that challenge than are any of the constitutional
standards used to frame that response. If one views Establishment
Clause cases from the bottom-line perspective of Holmes' "bad
man, " 15 then the best way to assess the current status of any Estab-
lishment Clause issue on the Supreme Court is to focus on how the
Justices respond to particular factual contexts, rather than on how
they explain their behavior. The frustrating thing about modern Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence is that the Justices' responses to
some factual contexts in which church/state issues arise are deeply
inconsistent with how they respond to other church/state disputes.
The real problem with the modern Court's Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence is not that the Court has ten different constitutional stan-
dards; rather, the problem is that the Court seems to be applying four
158 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for
the material consequences....").
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different Establishment Clauses. The next section describes these
four clauses.
II. THE COURT'S FOUR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
This Section describes the modern Supreme Court's four Estab-
lishment Clauses. Within these four categories of cases, the modern
Court can generally produce consistent and predictable majorities.
The consistency and predictability ends, however, when one crosses
the boundary from one Establishment Clause category to another.
Justices switch sides, the majority alters its analysis, and the focal
point and sensitivity to infringements of religious liberty will differ
markedly depending on the category into which a case falls. Some
Justices have a more pronounced problem than others in arriving at a
consistent approach to the Establishment Clause, but this is not a
phenomenon that is limited to Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who
have been the perennial swing votes for over a decade. Even the
most separationist Justices are, in the end, willing to countenance
government actions that contradict their generally separationist atti-
tudes, and even the most accommodationist Justices will often recoil
from the religiously divisive consequences entailed by their embrace
of a sectarian state. And so we are left with a fractured doctrine that
has no central focus and is vulnerable to the most basic kinds of logi-
cal critique. There are four Establishment Clauses because different
majorities within the Court want the government to have a different
relationship with organized religion in different contexts. The ques-
tion is whether it makes sense to have religion play such different
roles in areas that are often quite closely related and theoretically in-
distinguishable. That question will be addressed in the next Section,
after a description of the Court's four Establishment Clauses.
A. The Separationist Establishment Clause
Jefferson's and Madison's Establishment Clause lives on in at least
one area of active First Amendment litigation. This is the first of the
modern Court's Establishment Clauses. This category of Establish-
ment Clause cases involves challenges to the government's symbolic
or verbal endorsement of religion. The category includes cases chal-
lenging public school prayer, 9 public school Bible-reading,' 60 gov-
159 See Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding unconstitutional
student prayer at a public high school football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional student prayer at a public high school graduation ceremony); Wal-
lace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute requiring a
moment of silent meditation in public school classrooms); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436
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ernment erection of religious holiday displays, 161 and government in-
signias containing religious symbols such as a cross. 62 In this category
of cases, six members of the Supreme Court have adhered fairly rig-
orously to the principle of separation of church and state during the
last two decades. This majority has been weakened, but not entirely
undermined, by Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court. In
the cases defining this area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
the Court has struck down school prayer in a range of different con-
texts, from state-drafted prayers in classrooms163 to prayers given by
individual students at high school football games.' The Supreme
Court has also struck down a Ten Commandments display in a public
school classroom. 165  Finally, on two occasions, the Court has struck
down statutes prohibiting or "balancing" the teaching of evolution in
public school classrooms. 166
The Court has been remarkably strict in cases involving overt gov-
ernment endorsement of religion, especially in the school context.
The Court's earliest rendition of the principle governing these cases
was summarized in the fairly narrow proposition that "in this country
it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers
for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
program carried on by government. ,161 In its more recent opinions,
however, this proposition has been broadened to a Jeffersonian-style
barrier against the infusion of the majority's religious views into gov-
(1962) (holding unconstitutional a state statute mandating the recitation of prayer in public
school classrooms).
16 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963) (holding unconstitutional statutes
requiring the reading of Bible passages over the intercom in public schools).
161 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (approving one holiday dis-
play located outside a government building and striking down another located inside a court-
house); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (approving a Pawtucket, Rhode Island
holiday display that included a Nativity scene along with several secular holiday objects).
162 See Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 158 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219
(1992) (upholding a city seal containing a Christian cross); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d
1401, 1415 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a city
logo containing a Christian cross); Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782
(10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (holding unconstitutional a city
seal containing a Christian cross); Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000-01 (W.D.
Mo. 1999) (holding unconstitutional a city seal containing a Christian fish symbol).
6 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 436 (holding unconstitutional the New York Regents' Prayer).
164 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 316-17 (holding unconstitutional student-initiated prayer at pub-
lic school football games).
1 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a state statute
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms).
66 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (striking down an Arkansas statute pro-
hibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools and universities); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 587, 597 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana statute requiring public school teachers to give
equal time to creationism whenever they teach evolution).
167 Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
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ernmental policy. In this regard, it is significant that many of the
cases involving symbolic governmental favoritism toward religion are
decided on the basis of the secular purpose component of the Lemon
test. Thus, even facially neutral policies, which may be subject to ex-
planation on secular grounds when read literally or viewed in the ab-
stract, have been deemed unconstitutional in light of the political ma-
jority's impermissible intent of using the government to advance its
religious views.
The Court has even reached out to strike down a statute that had
no practical effect-such as the Alabama silent meditation statute
struck down in Wallace v. Jafftee68-because of the obvious (and ad-
mitted) religious motives of an influential legislator who supported
the adoption of the statute. 69 In that case, the Court deemed the
separation principle important enough to require a symbolic clean-
sing of any religious impetus for the classroom moment of silence,
even though (as Justice O'Connor noted)," [i] t is difficult to discern
a serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful
schoolchildren."1 70 The religious background of the legislation alone
was sufficient to attract the Court's attention, even though the sym-
bolism had little measurable effect on the religious practices or be-
liefs of the students in the classroom.
The importance of symbolism in these cases has led the Justices to
issue some of their sternest lectures on the countermajoritarian func-
tion of the Establishment Clause. Ironically, Justice Kennedy au-
thored one of the strongest examples of this sort of statement in his
majority opinion for the Court in Lee v. Weisman.17' Among other
things, Justice Kennedy specifically distinguished the First Amend-
ment's mechanism for protecting religious liberty from the Amend-
ment's mechanism for protecting expressive liberty,12 thus rejecting
an analog between governmental religious expression and the right
of free speech, which opponents of church/state separation repeat-
168 The Court stnck down one statute that provided a one-minute period "for meditation or
voluntary prayer," while leaving intact a second statute that set aside a one-minute period "for
meditation." 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985).
169 The state senator who sponsored the challenged statute testified that he had "no other
purpose in mind" than to "return voluntary prayer to public school." Id. at 43.
170 Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Justice Kennedy's expression of these sentiments is ironic in light of
the very different views he expressed only a few years earlier in County of Allegheny v. ACLU See
492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the Establishment Clause gives government actors some latitude in accommodating religious
expression).
172 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 591 (stating that speech and religion are protected by different
mechanisms).
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edly advance. 73 In response to this attempt to draw a direct analogy
between the religion and speech provisions of the First Amendment,
Justice Kennedy noted, " [t] he Free Exercise Clause embraces a free-
dom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech
provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs
with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.", 74 Justice Ken-
nedy directly linked the very different First Amendment approaches
to religious and expressive liberty to the history of religious division
and conflict. This history led him to conclude, "in the hands of gov-
ernment what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views
may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.' 75 The remarkable
thing about these passages is not the sentiments themselves-which
do little more than reiterate Madison's much stronger phrasing of
the same points in the Memorial and Remonstrance--but rather Justice
Kennedy's application of them in a case in which (as Justice Scalia's
dissent repeatedly emphasized 7 6) the religious exercise was innocu-
ous, ecumenical, brief, and uttered by a religious figure who be-
longed to the same faith as the plaintiff. As in Wallace, the plaintiffs
injury in Lee v. Weisman largely was symbolic, but the depth of the sen-
timents expressed in the majority opinion's civics lesson communi-
cates volumes about the importance of that symbolic injury.
The Court often does a poor job of explaining why the religious
symbolism is so important in the endorsement cases. In Lee v. Weis-
man, Justice Kennedy attempted to link the religious symbolism to his
favored theme of religious coercion, but that explanation is implau-
sible for two reasons. First, the coercion explanation is implausible as
an empirical matter because the prayer uttered at the graduation
ceremony had no discernible effect on the religious practices or be-
liefs of anyone in the audience. At most, as Justice Scalia snidely
pointed out, Deborah Weisman was "'subtly coerced' . .. to stand!"'
7
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the school's endorsement of a
173 The emphasis on religious free speech as a means of avoiding Establishment Clause prob-
lems raised by the injection of religion into public school classrooms was a key component of
one of then-Judge Alito's major church/state decisions when he served on the court of appeals.
See C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "public school students have the right to express religious views in class discussion
or in assigned work, provided that their expression falls within the scope of the discussion or
the assignment and provided that the school's restriction on expression does not satisfy strict
scrutiny").
174 Lee, 505 U.S. at 591.
175 Id. at 591-92.
176 See id. at 637-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dismissing scathingly the majority's contention
that benedictions at high school graduations are coercive and violative of students' First
Amendment rights based on United States traditions and history).
177 Id. at 638.
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brief religious exercise would in any way sway the religious leanings of
a student such as Ms. Weisman, who was resourceful and self-
confident enough to put her name on a lawsuit against her school
board to defend her religious liberty.
No matter how much Justice Kennedy would like to shoehorn the
symbolic endorsement cases into a coercion model, the fear of reli-
gious coercion is not the Court's primary concern in those cases.
There must be a reason why the Court has insisted since the earliest
school prayer decision that proof of coercion is not required to state
an Establishment Clause claim.' 78 The reason that the Court so vigor-
ously discourages the government from endorsing religion has much
more to do with what such endorsements communicate about the
structure of government and the nature of citizenship than whether
such endorsements directly compel individuals to engage in particu-
lar religious practices. Justice O'Connor recognizes this in opinions
explaining her endorsement theory, in which she emphasizes that
governmental endorsements of religion are problematic because
such endorsements "make religion relevant, in reality or public per-
ception, to status in the political community."'179 By neutralizing relig-
ion as an aspect of citizenship and political participation, the Estab-
lishment Clause ensures that one or a few dominant religious factions
will not capture the government, either overtly or subtly. By insulat-
ing the government from religious dominance, the Establishment
Clause bolsters the democratic mechanisms that allow the govern-
ment to respond to changing policy needs and social demographics
over long periods of time. In its symbolic endorsement cases, the
Court acknowledges that the only way to accomplish the goal of pro-
tecting diverse democratic governance over time in a country charac-
terized by shifting religious demographics is to build (in Justice
Black's terms) a "high and impregnable" wall between church and
state. 8"
As noted above, the Court has been remarkably consistent in pro-
tecting that wall in cases falling into this first category. There are a
few counterexamples, of course. The Court's politically skittish reluc-
tance to enter the controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance in an
178 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("Although these two clauses may in certain
instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not de-
pend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonob-
serving individuals or not.").
179 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,692 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
180 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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election year is one counterexample. s' The Court's willingness to
permit legislative prayer and payment of official chaplains is an-
other.18 2 A third example is Justice Breyer's odd fifth vote to permit
one official endorsement of the religious values represented by the
Ten Commandments, while voting to invalidate another.8 3 Part of
the explanation for these deviations from the Court's general attitude
toward symbolic endorsement may be that the Court has not yet been
willing to take the short logical step in extrapolating from the con-
cept of church/state separation the mandate of a totally secular gov-
ernment. The argument for taking this step is set forth in Section III.
Before making that argument, however, the more interesting
question is why the modern Court's hypersensitivity to religious ex-
clusionism in the symbolic endorsement cases does not carry over
into other areas of Establishment Clause litigation in which the gov-
ernment's educational and social service programs communicate the
same message of religious endorsement and exclusion in a much
more pronounced fashion. In reviewing government action in these
areas, the Court not only suppresses its inclination to control the gov-
ernment's religious message; the Court actually permits the govern-
ment to employ religious agencies to carry out government policies
and uses its taxing and spending authority to finance explicitly reli-
gious activities. In cases involving the government financing of reli-
gious education, for example, the Court encourages the linkage of
government and religion with the same consistency as it discourages
such a linkage in the symbolic endorsement context. These financ-
ing cases are the subject of the Court's second Establishment Clause,
which is described in the next subsection.
B. The Neutral Establishment Clause
The modern Court's second Establishment Clause applies to the
category of cases in which the government chooses to finance or sub-
sidize religious activity or institutions. The school voucher,8 4 school
181 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (relying on prudential
standing doctrine to reject a constitutional challenge to the inclusion of the words "under God"
in the Pledge of Allegiance).
182 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska legislature's prac-
tice of hiring an official chaplain and beginning each legislative session with a prayer).
183 See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2872 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (voting to
uphold the display of the Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capitol); McCreary Cty. v.
ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005) (striking down a display of the Ten Commandments at a
Kentucky county courthouse).
184 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the Cleveland school
voucher program, which funnels millions of dollars of government funds to private religious
schools).
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financing,1 5 and charitable choice cases 8 6 are the primary examples
of this category. In this category, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor in-
variably have voted with the Court's newly ascendant church/state
accommodationists instead of the Court's four remaining
church/state separationists, and this voting pattern has produced a
narrow but solid 5-4 majority supporting substantial government fi-
nancial support for religious institutions. There is little reason to
doubt that this alignment will continue with the addition of ChiefJus-
tice Roberts andJustice Alito.1s 7 The only real limitation that this new
majority places on government financial support of religious social
service and educational programs is that the program must be "neu-
tral" in the sense that it may not favor religious recipients of govern-
ment aid over nonreligious recipients.
As noted in Section I, while Justice O'Connor remained on the
Court, there were a few slight differences among members of the five-
member majority about the meaning of "neutrality" when it came to
articulating the remaining limits on direct government financial aid
to religious institutions.""' In the Court's recent school-funding deci-
sions, four Justices would reduce the Establishment Clause to the es-
sentially meaningless requirement of formal neutrality. Under this
requirement, the mere formal availability of aid to secular organiza-
tions in a particular government program would be sufficient to sat-
isfy the Constitution, even if the program actually operated in a way
that funneled almost all of the available government funds to reli-
gious groups.8 9 This faction of the Court would apply the formal
neutrality requirement to both indirect and direct government aid
programs. As noted in Section I, the opinions issued on this subject
all have involved government financing of private religious educa-
185 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a government program through
which federal funds are used to purchase educational materials for private religious schools).
186 The most recent charitable choice proposals have not yet been reviewed by the Court, but
in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court rejected a facial constitutional challenge to
an early version of a program that specifically encouraged the use of religious groups to carry
out government social policies. For one statement of the general policy behind charitable
choice programs, see Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (creating the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
187 For a discussion of the Court's take on formal neutrality with the addition of Justices Rob-
erts and Alito, see supra note 106.
188 For an overview of neutrality, see supra notes 89-115 and accompanying text.
1 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658 ("The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program
simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private
schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
school. As we said in Mueller, '[sluch an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this
field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evi-
dence might be evaluated.'" (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983))).
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tion.'90 In the indirect financial aid programs, such as the Cleveland
school voucher scheme upheld in Zelman, the government funnels
funds to religious schools through the parents of children at the
schools, who are the ostensible recipients of the aid.' 9' In the direct
aid programs, the government provides funds that are used to fi-
nance the purchase of educational materials such as computers and
blackboards, which are then provided to religious schools.' 92 In an
indirect aid program, formal neutrality is satisfied if secular schools
are permitted to participate in the aid program on the same terms as
religious schools, even if the terms of the program tend to favor the
religious schools, and even if an overwhelming number of the schools
that participate in the program are religious in nature.'93 In a direct
aid program, formal neutrality is satisfied if both secular and religious
schools are allowed to participate in the program, even if the reli-
gious schools use the materials purchased with the government aid
for overtly religious purposes.194
As the fifth vote in these cases, Justice O'Connor was reluctant to
go quite as far as her four colleagues in approving unfettered state
195funding of religious education. But as noted above, her reserva-
tions were more hypothetical than real. The limits she suggested
provided very little protection from the potentially massive infusion
of government funds into religious education. In the indirect finan-
cial aid cases, for example, she suggested that she would be willing to
hold unconstitutional any program in which parents were not offered
the option of sending their children to secular private schools.196 But
in making the assessment of whether religious schools dominated the
Cleveland voucher system reviewed by the Court in Zelman, she re-
fused to address the voucher system on its own terms and insisted on
counting public schools, magnet schools, and charter schools as part
190 For an extensive history of Court rulings on direct and indirect financial aid programs,
see supra notes 89-105.
191 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646 ("Where tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents
who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child. If parents choose a private school, checks
are made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to the chosen school.").
192 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802-03 (2000) (describing the process by which mate-
rials are provided to private schools).
193 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 657 (noting with approval that eighty-two percent of the schools
that participated in the Cleveland voucher program were religious).
194 See Mitchel, 530 U.S. at 824 (noting that the religious use of state-provided educational
materials could not be attributed to the state, and therefore would not violate the Establishment
Clause).
195 For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's position, see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying
text.
19 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that she is "persuaded that
the Cleveland voucher program affords parents of eligible children genuine nonreligious op-
tions").
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of the funding mix.1 97 Because the schools in these latter categories
were by definition secular (because they were public schools), this as-
sessment made it possible for Justice O'Connor to dismiss the fact
that ninety-six percent of the schools receiving voucher funds were
religious in nature.95
In the direct funding context, Justice O'Connor's reservations po-
tentially could have restricted public funding of religious education
because (unlike the other four Justices in the majority) she would
have held unconstitutional any diversion of government funds for
overtly religious purposes.199
Unfortunately, the impediments to enforcing this restriction se-
verely limited its effectiveness. Justice O'Connor rejected a facial
constitutional challenge to an aid program that provided millions of
dollars worth of equipment to religious schools, based on her pre-
sumption that most religious schools who receive government aid
would act in good faith and refrain from converting the aid to reli-
200
gious purposes. Overcoming this presumption would require de-
tailed private oversight of the internal operations of religious schools.
This would be a difficult task, given the fact that the schools are
populated by students and teachers who have a vested interest in not
revealing any impermissible diversion of government aid to religious
purposes. Any government body that seeks to increase public fund-
ing of religious education by enacting an aid program also is unlikely
to aggressively oversee the impermissible diversion of the funds. The
expense and complications of litigating every instance of diversion
would compound these problems. In the absence of aggressive gov-
ernmental oversight, an O'Connor-style limit on the diversion of
funds would be difficult to police because public interest groups
would have to bring a separate lawsuit against every recipient of aid
that impermissibly diverts funds. It is plausible to expect that many
institutions converting their government aid to religious purposes will
go undetected or unchallenged.
Thus, even before the departure of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, five members of the Court were willing to permit
large infusions of taxpayer funds into the system of private religious
education. If anything, the five-member majority in favor of such
transfers of government funds to religious institutions is likely to so-
197 Id. at 663-64 (discussing other types of schools receiving state assistance).
198 Id. at 664 (noting that if all different types of schools are considered, instead of just
schools financed by the private school voucher plan, then the total percentage of state-assisted
students attending religious schools drops from 96% to 16.5%).
199 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing the divertibility of secu-
lar aid for religious use).
200 Id. at 858 ("[P]resumptions of religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate when
evaluating neutral school aid programs under the Establishment Clause.").
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lidify in the absence of Justice O'Connor's muted skepticism. Pre-
sumably the Court's new majority will take a similar attitude to the
participation of religious groups in charitable choice programs.201
The Court's doctrine in the financing cases-which I have termed
the Court's second Establishment Clause-thus essentially eliminates
the barriers to church/state symbiosis that the Court routinely pro-
hibits in the cases involving symbolic governmental endorsement of
religion-which are governed by what I have termed the Court's first
Establishment Clause.
The problem is that the bodies of doctrine that underlie these two
Establishment Clauses-the separationist clause governing endorse-
ment and the neutrality clause governing financing-are intrinsically
and comprehensively inconsistent. Under the theory of neutrality
that governs the second Establishment Clause, a government pro-
gram that permits both secular and sectarian entities to compete for
government favoritism (in the form of money) is constitutional, even
if the practical result is that religious organizations receive virtually
100% of the government's assistance. (Recall that, in the Cleveland
voucher case, the Court upheld a program in which students attend-
ing religious schools received ninety-six percent of the government
funds. ° )
Yet the Court specifically and repeatedly has rejected the applica-
tion of this theory of neutrality in the endorsement context. Schools
attempting to defend their prayer or Bible-reading programs fre-
quently have argued that these programs are "neutral" in the sense
that all religious groups can compete to participate in the program.
In School District v. Schempp, for example, the government attempted
to defend its policy permitting Bible-reading over a public school in-
tercom on the ground that the students chose the Bible passages and
could read from their own personal Bibles. °4 Thus, like the later
voucher cases, the program involved individual (rather than govern-
mental) religious choice and the beneficiaries under the program
were not limited to members of one faith. Nevertheless, the Court
struck down the program. Indeed, the Court used the state's nod to-
ward ecumenism as proof that the state recognized "the place of the
Bible as an instrument of religion... and [its] recognition of the
pervading religious character of the ceremony.,
20
5
201 As noted, the Court already has rejected a facial challenge to an earlier version of these
programs. See supra note 187.
.02 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (noting that, of the 3,700 students who participated in the
voucher program, 96% were enrolled in religious schools).
203 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
204 See id. at 207 (recounting the nature of the public school policy).
205 id. at 224.
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In a much more recent variation on this same theme, the school
board in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe attempted to defend
its policy of permitting students to pray before public school football
games on the ground that the students, rather than the school system
itself, would vote on whether the pre-game ceremony would include a
prayer and what that prayer would contain. The Court rejected this
argument on the ground that this majoritarian system would effec-
tively guarantee that the religious majority would always dominate the
forum, explaining that "the majoritarian process implemented by the
District guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never
prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced. 2 0 ' What was
true in Santa Fe, Texas, however, was also true in Cleveland, Ohio: in
a country where the system of private education is dominated by the
religious majority, a formally "neutral" system will effectively ensure
that most of the benefits will go to that majority.
The majority's contradictory attitude toward the constitutional
significance of formal neutrality is not the only difference between
the Court's first and second Establishment Clauses. There are also
deeper theoretical differences between the Court's approaches to the
two types of cases. The Court's first and second Establishment
Clauses rest on theoretical assumptions about the relationship be-
tween church and state that are completely incompatible. Three of
these assumptions are especially telling. First, in the financing cases
the Court approves the government's authority to make the political
judgment that religion serves a positive social function. In rejecting
an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal family planning stat-
ute, for example, the Court stated that "it seems quite sensible for
Congress to recognize that religious organizations can influence val-
ues and can have some influence on family life, including parents' re-
lations with their adolescent children., 208 In the endorsement cases,
on the other hand, the Court prohibits the government from taking
any position on the relative benefits or advantages of religion in gen-
eral or a specific religion in particular. °
206 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (outlining the school district's defense of its policy).
207 Id. at 304.
208 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988).
209 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) ("The First Amendment's Religion Clauses
mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or
prescribed by the State. The design of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere,
which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435
(1962) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this
country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for
religious guidance.").
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Second, in the financing cases, the Court has approved the prin-
ciple that the government can provide financial assistance for reli-
gious education, which is one of the primary mechanisms by which
churches cultivate their young members and attract new adherents.
In the endorsement area, on the other hand, the Court has held that
the government cannot sponsor messages by the religious majority
celebrating, advancing, or reaffirming its faith,"O nor can the gov-
ernment undertake the task of defining a common religious ground
on which "once conflicting faiths [may] express the shared convic-
tion that there is an ethic and a morality which transcend human in-
vention. 21
Finally, the Court repeatedly expresses its concern with the coer-
cive effects government action may have on religious dissenters in the
endorsement context, while in the financing context it permits the
government to collect taxes from religious dissenters and use those
funds to finance religious activities, including education. Forcing
one set of adherents to pay for the sectarian activities of their reli-
gious adversaries is quintessentially coercive. Thus, there is a stark
contrast between the Court's approach to coercion under the first
and second Establishment Clauses: the Court prohibits indirect, sub-
tie, and psychological coercion in one context, while permitting di-
rect, overt, and concrete coercion in the other.
It is not immediately evident why the same concerns that motivate
the Court in one context seem negligible or nonexistent to the Court
in others. But to make matters worse, the Court seems to have identi-
fied two other Establishment Clauses, which advance two other per-
spectives on church/state relations. The approaches taken under
these other two Establishment Clauses are related and may portend a
tendency toward giving up on the entire project of defining through
constitutional litigation the proper limits of church and state.
C. The Nondiscrimination Establishment Clause
The Court's third Establishment Clause is actually discussed in
cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause. Even though the
Court addresses these cases in terms of identifying rights under the
Free Exercise Clause, these decisions are relevant to defining the Es-
tablishment Clause limits on government because they deal with the
extent to which the government can interfere with minority religious
practices in order to advance the social mores of the political and re-
ligious majority. Examples of recent cases in this category involve the
210 See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307 (discussing a pre-football game prayer over a public ad-
dress system).
211 Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
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enforcement of drug abuse laws against members of Native American
religious groups that use drugs in their religious 2 12relgios ro  atusedrus  eirreigiusceremonies and
the enforcement of animal abuse statutes against religious Practitio-
ners who sacrifice animals during their religious ceremonies.
In the first of these cases, Employment Division v. Smith, the Court
held that under the Free Exercise Clause, "generally applicable, relig-
ion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular reli-
gious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental in-
terest. ''21 4 In the second of these cases, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, the Court elaborated on what it meant by the concept
of "generally applicable." In Lukumi, the Court resorted once more
to the concept of neutrality, although the Court gave the term a
somewhat different scope than it gave the similar term in the Estab-
lishment Clause cases involving government financing of religious ac-
tivities:
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible if
the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it
is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance
that interest.
The Court emphasized that the legislature's intent was as crucial as
the actual phrasing of the statute or policy in determining whether
the government action was neutral, explaining: "Facial neutrality is
not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment
Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause 'forbids
subtle departures from neutrality,' and 'covert suppression of particu-
lar religious beliefs.' 216 In sum, the Lukumi version of neutrality pro-
duces a nondiscrimination rule that policies are unconstitutional only
if they discriminate against an individual or group based on religious
faith. Based on this theory, the Court held the City of Hialeah's pro-
hibition of animal sacrifices unconstitutional because "Santeria wor-
ship service was the object of the ordinances.
217
This rendition of the Free Exercise Clause has several implications
for the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. At first glance,
the nondiscrimination principle of Lukumi seems to complement the
general thrust of the Court's first Establishment Clause requirement
of no religious endorsement. "In our Establishment Clause cases we
212 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding the prohibition of sacra-
mental peyote use).
213 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating a
statute targeted at curbing animal sacrifices by practitioners of the Santeria religion).
214 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
215 508 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).
256 Id. at 534 (citations omitted).
217 ,
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have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an
official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in
general. 2 1 8 As the Lukumi Court notes, its principle simply takes the
no-endorsement proposition that the government may not act in ways
that favor a religious faith (or religion in general) and adds to it the
seemingly unobjectionable principle that the government cannot act
in ways that disfavor the exercise of religious faith.
At second glance, however, the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause in Smith and Lukumi seems less like the Court's first,
separationist Establishment Clause and more like its second, majori-
tarian Establishment Clause. What at first glance seems like a prohi-
bition of religious favoritism, at second glance seems to embody reli-
gious favoritism. Two consequences of the Court's Smith and Lukumi
decisions support this conclusion. First, the Court's holdings in Smith
and Lukumi actually prohibit only a very narrow range of government
conduct, and the prohibition does not exhaust the various ways in
which religious favoritism can infect government conduct. The non-
discrimination rule of Smith and Lukumi comes into effect only when
the government somehow communicates-either through the phras-
ing of a government dictate or the legislative history leading up to the
policy's adoption-its disfavor of a specific religious faith and its
practitioners.
The nondiscrimination rule does not, however, in any way limit
the government's ability to enact regulations based on assumptions
and moral frameworks that are heavily imbued with the majority's
faith. The drug laws at issue in Smith have obvious secular purposes,
but the government's unwillingness to carve out exemptions to those
laws for individuals participating in religious ceremonies exhibits an
insensitivity to religious dissenters that is informed by the majority's
greater familiarity with their own religions' ceremonial use of sacred
intoxicants other than peyote. It is unlikely, for example, that the
State of Oregon would similarly insist on rigidly applying its underage
drinking laws to the ingestion by minors of sacramental wine. The
disjunction between the rules applicable to familiar and common re-
ligious practices and those that apply to unfamiliar and strange reli-
gious practices amounts to a form of favoritism toward the sorts of
broad-based faiths that tend to be dominant among members of the
political majority. Not only is favoritism of the majority implicit in
the standard, it was explicitly embraced by the majority in Smith:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic gov-
ernment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
218 Id. at 532.
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unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
19
There is another respect in which the Smith/Lukumi nondiscrimi-
nation rule favors the lifestyles, values, and practices of the religious
majority. While the Smith/Lukumi rule protects religious groups
from the overtly hostile actions of legislators and government offi-
cials, it does not protect members of the general population from
governmental actions that have significant religious overtones to
those running the government. Many current controversies fall into
this category. The disputes over abortion and homosexual rights are
two prominent examples. As both Justices and academic commenta-
tors have pointed out, the regulation of abortion has significant reli-
gious overtones and is probably inextricably bound up with inher-
ently religious notions regarding the ensoulment of the fetus.
20
Criminal prohibitions of homosexual conduct are likewise deeply
rooted in religious teachings. As Chief Justice Burger concurred in
Bowers v. Hardwick, "Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted
in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards., 221 While Lawrence v.
Texas provides immediate relief from moral regulations pertaining to
intimate sexual conduct, the Court's majority opinion specifically
leaves intact regulations of other aspects of homosexual relations
22whose regulation have equally deep religious roots.
The problem with the Court's nondiscrimination principle is that
it prohibits discrimination against religion, but it does nothing to
prohibit discrimination in favor of religion.223 When the constitu-
tional companion to the Free Exercise Clause is viewed in light of this
219 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
220 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declara-
tions that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization makes the rele-
vant portion of the preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the Federal Constitution."); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993) (arguing that any
pre-viability regulation of abortion would be based on inherently religious determinations and
therefore would violate the Establishment Clause); Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381, 418-25 (1992) (same).
221 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, J., concurring).
222 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (implying that the government may retain
the authority "to define the meaning of the relationship or... set its boundaries" in situations
in which that relationship threatens "abuse of an institution the law protects"); id. at 578 (not-
ing that the decision in Lawrence "does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter").
223 For an example of arguable discrimination "in favor of" religion, see Cutter v. Wilkinson,
125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005). In Cutter, the Supreme Court upheld the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 (a) (2000), which provides accommodations for
prisoners who engage in religious activities, but provides no such accommodations for similar
activities of nonreligious prisoners. The Court did not deny that such discrimination existed
but only noted that if such discrimination were significant "all manner of religious accommoda-
tions would fall." Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2124.
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principle, we can see a "third" possible Establishment Clause. Under
this third Establishment Clause, religious dissenters are left to a po-
litical process that can surreptitiously advance religious values, ham-
pered only by the restriction of nondiscrimination. Put another way,
the third Establishment Clause does not prohibit the political major-
ity from indiscriminately forcing everyone in society to conform to an
ethos that is so permeated with the majority's most deeply felt reli-
gious values that the majority views the values as transcending relig-
ion.
D. The Deconstitutionalized Establishment Clause
The theme of religious majoritarianism is the defining feature of
the Court's second and third Establishment Clauses. Under the
Court's second Establishment Clause, an overtly religious political
majority may fund religious activity from general tax revenue, pro-
vided that the legislature is careful to craft the appropriations meas-
ure in sufficiently "neutral" terms. Likewise, under the Court's third
Establishment Clause, the political majority may craft draconian
moral regulations that track the behavioral guidelines provided by
the majority's religious leaders-provided that the legislation applies
the moral regulation in a nondiscriminatory way. The Court's fourth
Establishment Clause continues to emphasize the theme of majori-
tarianism, but it takes this theme to a new level and does so in a con-
text that may discomfort even the religious groups that usually ap-
plaud the Court's recent Establishment Clause tendencies.224
The fourth Establishment Clause is a very recent creation. In
Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington state univer-
sity scholarship program that assists academically gifted students with
post-secondary educational expenses, but denies funding to students
seeking devotional theology degrees.22 5 The state's refusal to fund
devotional theology degrees is necessary to comply with the Washing-
ton state constitution's version of the Establishment Clause, which is
phrased more precisely than the federal version. According to Wash-
ington's version of the Establishment Clause, "No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious wor-
ship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious estab-
lishment.,
226
The United States Supreme Court held that the Washington stat-
ute and constitution do not violate the federal Constitution's Estab-
lishment or Free Exercise Clauses. The Court rejected the plaintiffs
24 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. (upholding WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12) (f)-(g) (2003)).
226 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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claim that the Washington policy violated the nondiscrimination
principle of Lukumi, even though Washington essentially provided
scholarships to all students except religious students seeking theology
degrees. To uphold the Lukumi claim, the Court concluded, "would
extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but
their reasoning. 2 27 In defense of its conclusion, the Court recog-
nized that from the earliest days of the country's history, many states
have refused to expend tax money on religious enterprises.228 Wash-
ington's scholarship program follows in this tradition, and the Court
held that nothing in the Establishment Clause requires states to fund
training for religious occupations against the state's will. The State of
Washington did not discriminate against religion or religious per-
sons, the Court held, because it "ha[d] merely chosen not to fund a
distinct category of instruction. 2 9
This decision creates yet another variation on the theme of neu-
trality in the Court's jurisprudence. Whereas the Court's Zelman-style
version of neutrality permits states to aid religion if they so desire on
an ecumenical basis, the Court's Locke-style version of neutrality hark-
ens back to the Court's earliest Establishment Clause cases, in which
the term "neutrality" referred to what the Court used to call "strict
neutrality." Under this version of neutrality, the government must
obey the command to remain stricdy neutral on matters of religion,
"neither aiding nor opposing religion. 2 ° Under the new version of
this theory described in Locke, however, strict neutrality is no longer
required by the federal Constitution; rather, it is one approach
among many that the federal Constitution allows each state to choose
on its own. Under Locke, the separation of church and state has been
demoted from a federal constitutional command to a state policy op-
tion.
This approach has the effect of deconstitutionalizing questions re-
lating to government financing of religion. Religious and secular
groups are being told to fight these matters out in the political arena;
and under either Zelman or Locke, the Court is likely to uphold what-
ever policy the participants in each state's political process decide to
adopt. This approach may actually be the most dangerous of all the
Court's four current Establishment Clauses, when viewed from the
perspective of all religious faiths. What this approach portends is a
Hobbesian war of all against all for dominance of the civic culture
and government purse. Since the core religious dictates that are the
basis for the conflict will be absolutist and non-negotiable, all sides
227 Locke, 540 U.S. at 720.
228 Id. at 721-23.
229 Id. at 721.
230 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
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will seek total victory in order to pursue their version of sacred truth.
Even if some religious groups do not wish to enter the culture war or
have no desire to foist their views upon others, they will be forced to
enter the fray and seek victory as a necessary act of self-defense. If
everything turns on the outcome of the political battle, after all, then
both sides would be well advised to fight to the death to ensure that
their view of eternal salvation dominates. Millions of dollars (and the
souls those dollars may entice) are at stake. The country has wit-
nessed this ugly scenario before, 23' and if Locke is any indication, we
may be about to do so again.
None of this is intended to convey the impression that the actual
result in Locke is wrong. The result in Locke is correct: The Constitu-
tion does not require the State of Washington to finance Joshua
Davey's religious education. But the rationale for this result is not
that the Jeffersonian separationists happen to have captured control
of the Washington State Legislature and imposed their will on the
state. That rationale sends a message to proponents of state-financed
religious education that they should redouble their efforts to bring
religious disputes into the public sphere and fight to grab control of
the public "fisc" back from their religious opponents. It is not possi-
ble to conceive of a more potentially poisonous message to send in an
increasingly divided and religiously factionalized society. The reason
the Court's result was correct in Locke is not that the Court properly
respected the results of a religiously inflamed political process, but
rather that in our system, the question should never have been a mat-
ter of state political authority at all. The reason that the result in
Locke is correct is that the Establishment Clause provides the frame-
work for a secular society in which the financing of religious educa-
tion is relegated entirely to the private sector.
The Court's decision in Locke is unsatisfactory, because in that de-
cision, the majority defines a new, "fourth" Establishment Clause in
which the Court no longer even bothers to address the central issues
that have always been at the heart of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, such as: What is the proper relationship between church and
state? What are the proper parameters of religious governance in a
pluralistic democracy? Can the government legitimately coerce
members of one faith to pay for the training of another faith's clergy?
In Locke, the Court throws up its hands and gives up even participat-
ing in the discussion. "Fight it out among yourselves," the Court
seems to sigh; and if you don't like the result reached by the State of
Washington, then move to Alabama. In this sense, the Court's fourth
Establishment Clause may ultimately absorb the other three. If the
231 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
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Court is willing to let a religiously charged political process sort out
the issues that got the Establishment Clause ball rolling to begin with,
then there is no reason why the Court shouldn't be willing to let the
same process sort out all the other issues as well. This, of course, is
just another way of saying, "Let the religious wars begin."
III. THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF SECULARISM AND THEOCRACY
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the material dis-
cussed in the preceding Sections is that the Court's current Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is inconsistent to the point of inco-
herence. The problem cannot be attributed simply to the ineptly
drafted standards discussed in Section I. Despite the inherent diffi-
culties in deciphering constitutional standards that are phrased in
vague terms such as "coercion," "endorsement," or "neutrality," the
problem with the Court's current Establishment Clause regime is not
primarily linguistic nor definitional. After all, the Court even has
problems consistently applying the most unambiguous of its stan-
dards (such as the "secular purpose," "secular effect," and "no-
entanglement" requirements of Lemon). The problem is much
deeper: The problem lies in the Court's unwillingness to settle on a
comprehensive (and comprehensible) theory of the Establishment
Clause. No set of standards will make sense unless those standards
are informed by some notion of what they are supposed to accom-
plish. As the material described in Section II illustrates, several of the
Court's current Justices cannot decide what function the Establish-
ment Clause should serve. Their indecision has fractured the Court's
church/state jurisprudence to the point that the Court is now apply-
ing multiple Establishment Clauses, each of which is conceptually dis-
tinct from the others.
The Court's inability to define one set of goals and purposes for
the Establishment Clause is reflected in the debate within the aca-
demic literature over the larger meaning of the Clause. Because of
the two new appointments to the Court and the possibility of one or
more additional appointments to the Court in the near future, the
country has now arrived at a crucial juncture in the debates over the
constitutional law of church and state. It is no longer true-as it
probably was as recently as a decade ago-that the basic value of
separationism defines the field for most of the mainstream players in
this area of constitutional law. As Chip Lupu and Robert Tuttle re-
cently noted, "only the most ostrich-like Separationist could have de-
nied the flux in the law of the Establishment Clause., 23 2 The debate
232 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next
Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 917, 918 (2003).
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today is not over how aggressively to pursue the central value repre-
sented by the separation of church and state. Rather, the debate to-
day is over whether we should abandon the goal of separation alto-
gether. This increasingly vociferous debate over basic values
threatens to reorient Establishment Clause jurisprudence in unex-
pected and imprudent ways. Abandoning the separation principle
will entail changing many of our present assumptions about the pow-
ers of government, the nature of citizenship, the influence of relig-
ion, and the very meaning of religious liberty.
The remainder of this Article is a series of caveats about this newly
invigorated effort to renounce the Jeffersonian objective of church/
state separation as the defining principle of the Establishment Clause.
These caveats are based on the blunt premise that abandoning sepa-
ration inevitably leads to the adoption of a sectarian vision of gov-
ernment and the evisceration of the Establishment Clause. This
premise follows from the simple logic of the separation principle and
its theocratic opposite. In sum, the logic of separationism can be re-
duced to four propositions: first, a meaningful principle of separa-
tionism requires a wholly secular government; second, any theory
that abandons separation necessarily will permit government to be
nonsecular; third, if the nature of government is nonsecular, then it
must be theocratic; and fourth, a theocratic government will never be
nonsectarian.
A more detailed defense of these propositions and the theory of
secular government that they support will be set forth below. Before
turning to that defense of separationism, however, brief attention will
be given to some of the common arguments against a rigorous theory
of church/state separation.
A. The Critique of Separation
The principle of separation of church and state has had a hard
time recently in the United States. For many years, the principle has
been attacked by those on the Supreme Court who would permit
government to engage directly in "nonpreferential" religious activ-
ity.2 33 Until recently, those Justices have been on the fringe of the
Court's Establishment Clause discussions. The vigor of these attacks
233 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45, 54 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment was not intended to interfere with state estab-
lishments of religion and asserting that although the First Amendment was written by James
Madison, it did not reflect his "extreme" views on separation of church and state); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting Jefferson's advocacy of a
"'wall of separation between church and State,'" asserting that Establishment Clause doctrine
"has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years," and
arguing that the First Amendment should permit nonpreferential establishments of religion).
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has been heightened lately, however, by salvos from some prominent
jurists and academics who argue that the entire separationist ideal is
nothing but a cover for Protestant attempts to dominate Catholicism
and/or secularist attempts to undermine organized religion, gener-
ally.
34
Even some former friends of separationism have abandoned the
ideal. Chip Lupu has argued that separationism is essentially already
dead, and that part of the reason for this death is separationism's un-
fortunate favoritism toward "[the] ideology of secular rationality.
2 35
According to Lupu, the secular rationality favored by separationism is
nonobjective (because it favors science and markets) and is not "par-
ticularly conducive to the life of the spirit, without which it may not
be possible for a nation to thrive. '3 6 Likewise, Michael Perry has re-
cently abandoned his earlier resistance to religiously based legisla-
tion2  and now argues that the Establishment Clause should permit
the legislature to embody religious morality in law.238 A separationist
Establishment Clause rule that prohibits the legal embodiment of re-
ligious morality "deprivilege Is] religious faith, relative to secular be-
lief, as a ground of moral judgment."23 9  Douglas Laycock has even
forsaken the use of the term "separation of church and state," be-
cause "the phrase has no sufficiently agreed meaning to be of any
use."2 40 He would prefer to treat separation as essentially coextensive
with a theory of substantive neutrality under which the government
would be required to "minimize government incentives to change re-
ligious behavior in either direction.,
241
234 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (arguing that the separationist prohi-
bition on government aid to pervasively sectarian institutions was targeted "almost exclusively
[at] Catholic parochial schools" and was therefore "born of bigotry[] [and] should be buried
now"); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that "the Establishment Clause ... [should be interpreted to] per-
mit[] government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion
plays in our society" and that the rigorous enforcement of the separation of church and state
would require government to recognize only the secular "to the exclusion and so to the detri-
ment of the religious"); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193 (2002)
(calling the separation of church and state a "Theologically Liberal, Anti-Catholic and Ameri-
can Principle").
25 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 279 (1994).
236 Id.
237 See MICHAELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES
30-38 (1997).
238 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 20-34
(2003).
259 Id. at 30.
240 Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1700 (2003)
(reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002)).
241 Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 71
(1997).
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It is easy to understand the perspective of some of the opponents
of separationism. When Jay Sekulow and his fellow lawyers for Pat
Robertson's American Center for Law and Justice argue that the the-
ory of separationism is "destructive" when viewed from the "political
perspective of Jefferson," because it is "wrought with the anticlerical
biases of the enlightenment,2 42 it is not hard to determine the overall
objective of the critique. If someone wants the government to ad-
vance the specific tenets of his or her particular faith or to expand
the influence of the concept of religion in general, then the separa-
tion of church and state is a principle that must be extinguished once
and for all. Religious hegemony through force of law is impossible if
religion must stand apart from the government.
But this point of view does not describe that of other recent op-
ponents of separationism such as Professors Lupu, Tuttle, Perry, and
Laycock. They are sensitive and thoughtful critics who are deeply
committed to the cause of religious liberty. For this reason, their
abandonment of separationism is more puzzling, as is their charac-
terization of the debate. To return to an example cited above, Pro-
fessor Laycock recently despaired that the very term "separation of
church and state" no longer has a sufficiently definitive meaning to
justify its prominent placement at the center of church/state discus-
sions. He notes that "to some people separation means protection of
religious activity from government, and to other people it means
suppression or subordination of religious activity by government.
2 4
1
The odd thing about this quote is that Professor Laycock leaves out a
third possible meaning, which probably comes closer to describing
how a majority of the Court actually has used the term "separation"
since the modern era of church/state jurisprudence began in Everson
v. Board of Education.44
242 Jay Alan Sekulow, et al., Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guid-
ingPrinciple in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 351, 382-83 (1995).
43 Laycock, supra note 240, at 1700.
24 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Everson Court was both specific and comprehensive in setting
forth what it meant by "separation of church and state" in the most famous passage from that
case:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
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The third possible meaning of separation interprets the term as
referring to the need to protect secular government from religious
domination and the political distortions that such domination entails.
This meaning is consistent with the first meaning of separation noted
by Laycock, but it does not at all encompass the second of Laycock's
possible meanings. When Laycock writes that a strong theory of
separation leads to the "suppression or subordination of religious ac-
tivity by government, '245 the clear implication is that a secular gov-
ernment in a separationist regime would take as its central objective
the "suppression or subordination" of religious activity in society at
large. This is a common argument against separationism, even
though it requires a significant logical leap that cannot be found in
any separationist literature. Separationist limits on the religious in-
fluence over government in the public sphere have little or nothing
to do with what that government may do to suppress or subordinate
religious activity in the private sphere. Moreover, no prominent
separationist on the Court or in academia has ever made the case that
a separationist regime permits-much less requires-the suppression
of religion in civil society.
In truth, opposition to separation does not turn on the purported
fear of governmental suppression of religion in the private sector, but
rather the more controversial fear that in a separationist regime the
religious majority in society will not be able to use the government to
advance its deeply felt values. 46 The third meaning of separation-
i.e., viewing separation as primarily concerned with the protection of
a secular government from religious domination-is resisted by those
who argue that government should be more accommodating to relig-
ion, because like Professor Laycock, they resist putting limits on how
the religious majority can exercise its political clout. Laycock is
forthright about this point in his criticism of versions of separation-
ism that link the theory to the requirement of a purely secular gov-
ernment:
Professor Lupu accurately describes a certain faction in recent controver-
sies, and that faction may call itself separationist; but its defining corn-
For what it is worth, this third meaning also comes much closer to describing the attitudes of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. In his fight to convince the Virginia legislature to pass
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom, Madison repeatedly returned to the argument that the
structure of government would be undermined by the intrusion of religion into politics. See
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in
Everson, 330 U.S. at app. 68 ("What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of
Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyr-
anny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people.").
245 Laycock, supra note 240, at 1700.
246 See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 239.
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mitment seems to be to secular supremacy and religious subordination,
or at least to religious marginalization.
As I have argued elsewhere, there is little basis for that version of
separation in constitutional text, history, or structure. So-called separa-
tionism that would privilege secular beliefs and bar religious arguments
from public debates mistakes freedom of speech and the working of de-
mocracy for establishment. It distorts constitutional provisions that pro-
tect the people from the government into provisions that protect the
government from the people.2
47
This quote is telling, because it indicates that even the liberal op-
ponents of separation are much more concerned with the influence
of religion over government policy than they are with the possibility
that religion will be suppressed in civil society. But once again, this
criticism caricatures the separationist argument: Contrary to the as-
sertions of Professor Laycock and others, no judicial opinion or
mainstream academic treatment advocating the separation of church
and state argues that a secular government should subordinate relig-
ion or enshrine atheism as the national anti-religion. Under a sepa-
rationist regime, religions are "marginalized" only in the sense that
they cannot use the law to finance their sectarian activities through
tax revenue or foist their views on nonadherents in public schools
and elsewhere. If this is marginalism, then members of minority reli-
gious groups may be forgiven for thinking that marginalism may not
be such a bad thing.
Laycock's tendentious phrasing of the problem is not unusual. It
is very common for proponents of the anti-separationist position to
use the rhetoric of government oppression of private faith to justify
an argument in favor of using government power to advance sectar-
ian ends. Michael McConnell once made a point similar to Laycock's
that employed much the same rhetorical shift: "the idea of 'separa-
tion between church and state' is either meaningless, or (worse) is a
prescription for secularization of areas of life that are properly plural-
i stic. 2  This statement cannot withstand close scrutiny. Why would a
constitutional rule that prohibits the government from advancing a
religious agenda inevitably have the effect of secularizing "areas of
life that are properly pluralistic?" If anything, the logic seems to work
in the other direction. A government that is required to stand apart
from controversies over the existence of God and the nature of His
moral mandates seems much more likely to foster a vibrant and plu-
ralistic private life than a government that is permitted to incorporate
one particular set of ultimate beliefs into law. Laycock makes a simi-
47 Laycock, supra note 241, at 47 (citations omitted).
248 Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should be Ex-
cluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 640-41.
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lar mistake when he argues that "[s] o-called separationism that would
privilege secular beliefs and bar religious arguments from public de-
bates mistakes freedom of speech and the working of democracy for
establishment. 2 49  But nothing in a separationist political regime
would bar religious arguments from public discussion, nor would
such a regime privilege secular beliefs over religious beliefs. A sepa-
rationist regime simply requires that some issues be taken off the
government's table and left to the private sector, where individuals
and private associations such as churches can join together and de-
cide these issues among themselves, free of majoritarian coercion
through law.
In the end, the arguments of liberal opponents of separationism
sound remarkably similar to the arguments used by conservative crit-
ics such as the American Center for Law and Justice, Michael
McConnell, and Richard Neuhaus.25 ° Both sets of anti-separationists
would empower religious groups to influence the government and
incorporate their views into law. Both groups base their conclusions
on three dubious assertions: first, that prohibiting government from
adopting religiously-based policies marginalizes and discriminates
against religious practitioners; second, that the separation of church
and state effectively enshrines secularism as the national faith; and
third, that religion is necessary to provide the deeper values that a
democracy needs to operate and thrive.
These are debatable propositions, which will be addressed further
in the next Section; but for now, it is noteworthy that the liberal and
conservative critics are basically in agreement about the perceived
problems with the separation principle. The two different groups
would undoubtedly impose different limits on how far the govern-
ment could go to enforce the religious majority's views.15' The ques-
249 Laycock, supra note 241, at 47.
250 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
251 For example, Professor Laycock submitted one of the most compelling briefs supporting
Michael Newdow's challenge to the inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Alle-
giance. See Brief for Rev. Dr. Betty Jane Bailey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624). The first half of this
brief provides abundant and eloquent support for Newdow's argument that the religious lan-
guage in the Pledge abridges the religious liberty of those not adhering to the majority faith.
See id. at 4-20. On the other hand, the second half of the brief also provides the framework and
detailed arguments eventually adopted by Justice O'Connor to support her conclusion that the
government's endorsement of the majority's religion in the Pledge does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. Compare id. at 20-29 (urging the Court to emphasize that the religious lan-
guage in the Pledge is not a prayer, does not refer to Christianity alone, is very short, was in the
Pledge for fifty years before being challenged, and cannot be imposed on anyone as part of a
mandatory recitation requirement), with Newdow, 542 U.S. at 37-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(adopting and discussing these justifications for upholding the religious endorsement in the
Pledge). The second half of Professor Laycock's brief can be explained as an understandable
exercise in controlling the damage to religious liberty inflicted by a Court unwilling to buck an
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tion, however, is whether the liberal critics can logically impose these
limits while simultaneously abandoning the separation of church and
state. In the next Section, I argue that they cannot.
B. The Defense of Separation
The outline of the case for separation of church and state is im-
plicit in the preceding responses to some of the critics of the separa-
tion principle. This Section will flesh out this argument by discussing
three propositions that are at the heart of the affirmative case for
separationism: (1) separationism is the only theory of church and
state that is compatible with the concept of limited constitutional
democracy; (2) a secular government is the only political mechanism
that can adequately implement the separation principle; and (3)
there is no alternative to separation except some form of theocracy,
which inevitably will devolve into either a mild or strong form of sec-
tarianism.
1. Democracy and Political Agnosticism
The arguments for the separation principle track many of the ar-
guments for pluralistic democracy in general. The separation princi-
ple is intricately connected to notions of limited government, which
are themselves tied to the concept of democracy as a long-term pro-
ject of popular governance. The separation principle is premised on
the theory that a proper democratic government must be defined by
more than mere procedural mechanisms to determine the composi-
tion of immediate electoral majorities. Under this theory, a proper
democracy must also be constrained by substantive limits on the ob-
jectives that government may pursue in exercising its authority. Spe-
cifically, a democratic government should avoid all exercise of power
that imposes through law a particular view of ultimate goods or any
totalizing view of morality and virtue. Government must be philoso-
phically, as well as theologically agnostic. This is not to say that the
government cannot pursue particular social goals; nor is it to say that
the government cannot package and justify these goals as value
choices. The key is that the government cannot present its policies as
ultimate value choices, which are by their nature permanent, im-
posed from outside the political system (e.g., dictated by God), and
incensed political majority. But it also highlights the central problem of attempting to protect
the liberty of religious dissenters while compromising on the separationist mandate. Once the
separation principle is abandoned, the ultimate battle for religious liberty is lost and all remain-
ing efforts amount to little more than damage control.
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therefore immunized from critique and revision by subsequent po-
litical majorities.
As I have explained elsewhere, this view of democracy is a simple
extrapolation from the basic attributes of every democratic regime.252
Under this view, a democratic political structure is defined by three
characteristics. A democratic government: (1) is subject to popular
control by properly enfranchised citizens; (2) ascribes legitimacy to
policies enacted by current majorities only if those policies are rec-
ognized as temporary and are subject to being revisited (and possibly
rejected) by subsequent majorities; and (3) is organized around a
process that emphasizes a common political discourse based on em-
pirical analysis and rational critique of government action. The first
characteristic is the sine qua non of democracy and is presumably un-
controversial. It would be difficult to define democracy without
popular control; after all, the Greek root of the word means "the peo-
ple. 25 1 If the first characteristic of popular control is a given for any
democratic system, then the other two characteristics follow inevita-
bly.
The second characteristic requires all policies to be temporary
and contingent, because otherwise the democratic process of alter-
nating majorities within a context of popular control could not con-
tinue to operate. Democratic governance (again defined as "popular
control") would be destroyed if a particular group or coalition could
capture the government at one point in time and enact policies that
were immunized from the contrary decisions of future majorities.
Democracy is not a one-time snapshot of one day's majority. Rather,
it is a process that (if the system is designed correctly) should operate
in perpetuity, since it is infinitely adaptable to new power structures
and political alliances. Thus, all policies enacted by a political major-
ity that currently controls a democratic government must be treated
as temporary and subject to revision or rejection by a future majority.
In a proper democracy, the law cannot embody any set of eternal
truths.
The third characteristic of democratic government flows from a
recognition that in a diverse civic culture, democratic conversations
about sef-governance must occur among citizens who have radically
different views of the moral universe. The moral absolutes that one
person derives from his or her religious faith will often be incompre-
hensible to others who do not share that person's particular theo-
logical orientation. In Richard Rorty's terms, religious rationales for
252 See Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990).
253 IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 442 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "democracy": Greek demok-
ratia, from demos "the people" plus -kratia "power, rule").
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public policy become "conversation stoppers,"2 4 and therefore can-
not advance the cause of democratic self-governance. Effective po-
litical conversations between citizens of a democracy must take place
on religiously neutral turf and be conducted in terms that are gener-
ally accessible to all. The pragmatic and earth-bound language of
empiricism and rationality provides a mutually accessible structure
for discourse about the common collective concerns of groups and
individuals who possess wildly varied ultimate values. Using this lan-
guage necessarily limits the scope of the discussion to exclude those
ultimate values, but this limitation is a necessary characteristic of a
functioning democracy. A diverse democratic culture cannot survive
over the long term if political discussions become hermetically sealed
monologues that are cast by each party in the terms of mutually ex-
clusive religious "Can't Helps."
2 55
One of the paradoxes implicit in democratic theory is that the
rules of democratic dialogue within the government cannot be en-
forced directly against individual citizens in their discourse con-
ducted outside the government. The democratic requisites of free
speech and open discussion could not operate effectively if the con-
stitutional regime allowed private citizens to participate in public dis-
course about political policies only if they agreed in advance to speak
in terms that were universally accessible to everyone else in society.
In the general society's public debate, speakers may use any terms
that they see fit, no matter how incomprehensible or exclusionary the
speakers' perspectives may be to those who do not share the speakers'
biases. Although the rule of universal accessibility cannot be en-
forced against private participants in political discussion, the rule can
be applied to citizens who join the government and employ the appa-
ratus of democratic legitimacy to make and enforce the law. Private
citizens cannot be forced to converse in particular ways, but the gov-
ernment can. This limitation on the government operates to hold the
government to its democratic obligation to render policies that are
acceptable (or at least understandable) even to citizens who have
radically different worldviews and fundamental values than those who
comprise the political majority.
If this conception of democracy is correct, then the government
may not base policy on religious grounds. If the government bases
policy on religious grounds, it renounces the central democratic req-
uisite of popular control (because it grants legal status to the dictates
of a supernatural entity, viz. God); and it effectively forecloses any
dialogue about the wisdom of particular policies. There is no point
254 See Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 172
(1999).
255 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
[Vol. 8:4
RECONCILING THE FOUR ESTABLISHMENT CLA USES
in debating the proposition that "God said so." Thus, the rule of uni-
versal political accessibility prohibits the government from basing its
policies on religious grounds-and hence, the Lemon secular purpose
requirement. As a practical matter, this requirement will not prevent
some legislators from surreptitiously slipping their religious views into
law, but it will prevent them from doing so if they cannot satisfy the
courts that there is some plausible nonreligious rationale for each
policy. The mandate to explain policies in secular terms will not only
prevent the government from enacting legislation that is exclusively
theological, but will also force legislators to internalize the essential
democratic lesson that they must respect the viewpoints of political
opponents, instead of only seeing opponents as apostates, heretics, or
sinners.
Professor Lupu complains that the separation principle privileges
the "the ideology of secular rationality, '2 but in reality it is democracy
itself that requires such an ideology. In a democracy, secular rational-
ity is the neutral territory on which people of competing faiths can
make decisions about practical issues of mutual importance, while
leaving aside ethereal matters having to do with irreconcilable no-
tions of the ultimate good. This does not diminish the importance of
the pursuit of an ultimate good, nor does it devalue the religious
faith that directs individuals in that search. A democracy simply shifts
these matters from the public sphere into a strong, vibrant, and vig-
orously protected private sector, in which discussions are outside the
control of the government and free from political sanction. The
fundamental right to retreat into the private sector when one loses
the political battle is no small consolation for renouncing the ability
to participate in a winner-takes-all war to control the government.
2. Separation as Secularism
If the depiction of democracy set forth above is correct, then it
follows that the separation of church and state is essential to ensure
that the government answers to the people rather than to the celes-
tial dictates of God's representatives. It also follows that separation
requires democratic governments to be exclusively secular in nature.
Once again, this trait follows from the central democratic characteris-
tic of popular governance. A democratic government must be free of
any pretense that it is carrying out the commands of an entity that
purports to be supreme to the people, themselves. In a democracy,
vox populi, vox Dei; the voice of the people is the voice of God (albeit
only within a set of constitutional parameters that limit the scope of
the popular government's concerns to the mundane postindustrial
256 Lupu, supra note 235, at 279.
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equivalents of making the trains run on time). Any attempt to move
beyond these mundane matters risks allowing the populi to think of
itself as the real Dei, at which point ordinary human hubris takes over,
the entire democratic project fails, and religious liberty is extin-
guished. As usual, the cynical Holmes had it right; he accepted that
everyone in society believed essential and unprovable truths that
would guide their choices and dictate their values, but he then de-
fined "truth" as "the system of [his] (intellectual) limitations. ' '257 The
political humility that produces rules limiting the scope of democ-
ratic policymaking derives from the recognition that intellectual limi-
tations can be collective as well as individual. Sometimes the voice we
hear is not really God at all, but the distorted sounds of our own self-
ish interests and personal fears.
Enforcing the Establishment Clause through the lens of the de-
mocratic mandate of limited secular government would provide both
substance and clarity to the fractured and incoherent area of juris-
prudence described in the first two sections of this article. The stan-
dards used to enforce the nonestablishment constitutional mandate
would not have to change under such a system. The Lemon test would
work quite effectively-if only the Court would free itself from the
self-defeating burden of accommodating a political culture "whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 258 It is little wonder that a
Court attempting to reconcile this proposition with the Lemon secular
purpose requirement produces incoherent jurisprudence. The cen-
tral problem with the Court's modem Establishment Clause doctrine
is that the Court's majority understands that it cannot follow the logic
of Justice Douglas's unfortunate phrase to anywhere near its logical
endpoint without weakening the basic protections of religious mi-
norities and undercutting democratic government itself.
Just as Lemon could be an effective tool for enforcing the democ-
ratic mandate of secular government, Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment analysis could provide a succinct explanation for the connec-
tion between the secular mandate and democratic citizenship.259
Justice O'Connor notes that governmental endorsements of religion
"make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community, , 60 which has the effect of disenfranchising
nonadherents of the majority's faith. When the government "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
257 Holmes, supra note 255, at 40.
25 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
259 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
260 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
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nity, ,2  the government violates the basic terms of a pluralistic de-
mocracy's social contract. A system that defines itself by popular con-
trol of the government robs itself of legitimacy if it ostracizes any
group of citizens who refuse to accept the government's ideological
and religious preconditions before exercising their franchise.
Viewing the Establishment Clause as mandating a secular gov-
ernment corrects the misconception that the Establishment Clause is
merely another variation on the theme of the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses. It is not. Unlike those clauses, which function to
protect individuals from the exercise of power by the government,
the Establishment Clause is intended to protect the structure of gov-
ernment itself. The Establishment Clause is primarily about politics,
not religion. The function of the Establishment Clause is to preserve
the fluid political culture that is one of the essential characteristics of
a constitutional democracy. This culture recognizes the temporal
and transitory nature of all power and policies. Such a system is fun-
damentally incompatible with religious ideals that have their basis in
eternal verities that neither can be questioned nor changed. To bor-
row a point Michael McConnell once made for other purposes, if
there is a God and God has already identified Truth and communi-
cated it to God's disciples, then that truth is superior to the policies
of government. 262 But from this perspective the disciples of God
would behave irresponsibly and even sinfully to concede power once
they obtain it. It would be their religious duty to defend eternal truth
against the infidels who happen to win the next election. But this at-
titude is obviously incompatible with the way democracies operate. A
political system that permits any politically powerful faction to use the
force of law to impose permanent truths on everyone in society de-
nies the transitory nature of policy and thereby also abandons de-
mocracy. Secular government may not protect against all threats to
democracy, but it would at least prevent that one.
3. The Impossibility of an "Established" Religious Heterodoxy
The previous two subsections set forth the affirmative case for
secular government as an essential structural component of a democ-
ratic political system. As noted, this would clarify the confusion cur-
rently plaguing Establishment Clause jurisprudence by providing a
conceptual baseline against which all government actions must be
261 Id. at 688.
262 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15
("[R]eligious claims-if true-are prior to and of greater dignity than the claims of the state. If
there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the authority of nations; that, in part, is what
we mean by 'God.' For the state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would
be to deny the possibility that a transcendent authority could exist.").
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measured. Having provided several affirmative arguments for secular
governance, this subsection sets forth a complementary negative ar-
gument for secular governance. The negative argument is simply
this: the only alternative to secular governance is a form of sectarian
theocracy. When opponents of the secular government requirement
inherent in separationism argue that this theory discriminates against
religious practitioners, the implicit message is that a theocratic gov-
ernment would be both ecumenical and nondiscriminatory. There is
good cause to believe that neither of these things is true. If this per-
ception is correct, then the religious discrimination claim so often
used against separationist theories is canceled out by the fact that the
same problem would exist under a theocratic regime.
To be clear about the terminology used here: The term "theoc-
racy" is being used to refer to a government whose officials view
themselves as being subject to divine guidance, and whose lawmakers
are permitted to base legislation (especially moral legislation) on ex-
plicitly religious grounds. The term "sectarian" refers to the subdivi-
sion of the group of theocracies whose officials and policies track the
teachings of a particular sect or group of sects.
Many of the arguments against separationism assume that the al-
ternative to secular government under a separationist regime is a be-
nign nonsectarian government that will respect the views and prac-
tices of many different faiths without privileging any church or its
followers. This is also the basis of the nonpreferential establishment
approach advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree.63
Separationist theory denies this possibility. The separationist claim is
that there is a stark choice between sectarian and secular governance.
There is no alternative to this choice. There is no middle ground be-
tween the two poles of political secularism and sectarianism, and no
third category can divide the realms of the religious and the secular
in a way that would satisfy the proponents of each. In other words,
there is no such thing as a "nonpreferential" religious establishment.
Any attempt to implement the objective of a nonsectarian theocracy
will: (1) produce a series of disingenuous doctrinal distinctions to
avoid the more oppressive implications of sectarian governance; (2)
degenerate into another series of incoherent and internally inconsis-
tent doctrines and standards; or (3) end up forthrightly embracing a
form of mild (or worse) sectarian majoritarianism.
Justifications of a system of religious governance will inevitably
end up adopting one of these three approaches, because the aca-
demic and judicial proponents of the anti-separationist cause will
never be able to impose logical limits on their newly pious govern-
263 See 472 U.S. 38 (1985); supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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ment. The religious adherents who gain power under the new consti-
tutional system of religious governance can issue repeated assurances
that they will protect members of other faiths-or no faith at all-but
the system will inevitably end up incorporating the majority's sectar-
ian beliefs and practices into law. This is inevitable because of the
very nature of religion. There is no such thing as a generic God
whose preeminence all believers and nonbelievers accept. Once
members of the political majority are allowed to introduce some ver-
sion of God into government and some version of God's command-
ments into law, it will become impossible to limit those sacred de-
crees and divine endorsements to benevolent and universally
acceptable truisms. Even a cursory review of religious doctrine re-
veals the absence of agreement about theological basics. Even bare
references to "God" effectively exclude from the government's reli-
gious tent Buddhists, Hindus, agnostics, atheists, and various propo-
nents of other minor sects. Insisting in the government's authority to
embrace this divisive and disputable religious figure will require
something on the order of Justice O'Connor's dismissal of such reli-
gious outsiders in her opinion affirming the constitutionality of the
religious reference in the Pledge of Allegiance:
The Pledge complies with [the Establishment Clause]. It does not refer
to a nation "under Jesus" or "under Vishnu," but instead acknowledges
religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic "God." Of
course, some religions[l Buddhism, for instance[2 are not based upon a
belief in a separate Supreme Being. But one would be hard pressed to
imagine a brief solemnizing reference to religion that would adequately
encompass every religious belief expressed by any citizen of this Nation.
The phrase "under God," conceived and added at a time when our na-
tional religious diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it
is now, represents a tolerable attempt to acknowledge religion and to in-
voke its solemnizing power without favoring any individual religious sect
or belief system.264
Justice O'Connor identifies the central issue when she notes that
"one would be hard pressed to imagine a brief solemnizing reference
to religion that would adequately encompass every religious belief
expressed by any citizen of this Nation. '26 ' Precisely. Once the gov-
ernment is allowed to endorse religion, some religions will be left
out. The pesky Buddhists will just have to understand that the Estab-
lishment Clause no longer will require the government to do any-
thing more than make a "tolerable attempt" to include them in the
country's religious inner-circle. Justice Scalia goes even further, bra-
264 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
265 Id.
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zenly abandoning any pretense of respect for those outside the ma-
jority's religious fold: In the newly devout republic inaugurated by
Justice Scalia and the other conservatives, religious outsiders simply
can be "disregard[ed] .,266
Once one accepts the premise that the Establishment Clause per-
mits the infusion of religion into government and that a religious
government will inevitably be sectarian, then it is difficult to see
where the logical limits of the government sectarianism might be.
This is an old lesson, and Madison included it in his definitive de-
fense of separationism: "Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects? '267 If the separation principle is removed
from the Constitution's nonestablishment mandate, and the Estab-
lishment Clause is interpreted to permit the government to endorse
God in general, then a logical extrapolation of this principle would
permit the government to endorse a specific God and all God's
commands. This is not to say that the government could establish re-
ligious prisons and imprison nonbelievers and others who would re-
sist the majority's religious mandates. The Free Exercise Clause, for
example, would presumably impose limits on the extent to which
apostates could be forced to worship a particular God in a particular
way. But in the end, provisions other than the Establishment Clause
would have to carry the full load in protecting the religious liberty of
dissenters, and those Clauses would have little effect on the many acts
of religious suasion that an increasingly pious government can be ex-
pected to advance.
Many of the attacks on separationism are based on a commend-
able concern with religious discrimination and disenfranchisement.
But if the critics of separationism have their way, they may find the
Court's post-separationist Establishment Clause far more troubling
than the weakly separationist jurisprudence that the new majority on
the Court will soon begin to dismantle. As for those of us who still
adhere to the apparently anachronistic separationist ideals of Madi-
son and Jefferson, perhaps we have been too hard on the modern
Court that held sway until Justice O'Connor's retirement. Maybe the
unsatisfactory current state of affairs is not as bad as some of us sup-
pose. We have an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is vague,
theoretically unsound, and riddled with inconsistencies. We have ten
different standards and four different bodies of Establishment Clause
266 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
267 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, supra note 7, at 1 3, re-
printed in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. 65 (1947).
[Vol. 8:4
Aug. 2006] RECONCILING THE FOUR ESTABLISHMENT CLA USES 799
jurisprudence. This situation is not good. But then again, four Es-
tablishment Clauses is better than no Establishment Clause at all.
CONCLUSION
The Court's current Establishment Clause is incoherent and un-
predictable, except by reference to the disparate personal responses
of Justices that cannot be reconciled in any theoretically comprehen-
sible way. The Court occasionally tries to paper over this unhappy
situation by making a virtue of incoherence, as when the Court once
claimed that its Establishment Clause doctrine "sacrifices clarity and
predictability for flexibility."268  The problem with this self-serving
characterization of the Court's doctrine is that it assumes what is self-
evidently missing from the Supreme Court's treatment of church/
state issues; i.e., that the "flexibility" the Court has so carefully culti-
vated serves some overriding goal in coordinating the relationship
between church and state. Flexibility in the pursuit of a consistent
constitutional objective would be praiseworthy; aimless elasticity is
evidence of an inexcusable failure of the Court to come to terms with
the difficult issues at the heart of all Establishment Clause controver-
sies.
Perhaps the Court has refused to grapple with the hard issues pre-
sented by church/state disputes because doing so would require the
Court to reach logical conclusions that both sides of the church/state
debate would find unsavory. On the one hand, if the Court were to
decide these disputes by recognizing that the United States is a reli-
gious country whose theological essence should be reflected in its
government, then the government should logically be allowed to en-
gage the apparatus of government to advance the chosen religious
ideals and should be allowed to require everyone-including nonad-
herents-to finance these theological activities through their taxes.
As long as nonadherents are not put in jail for worshipping at the
wrong church (or worshipping at no church at all), then they have no
right to expect anything more from their government. These people
are living in a religious (i.e., Christian) country, so they should get
used to it.
On the other hand, if the Court were to decide Establishment
Clause disputes consistently in the Jeffersonian/Madisonian "wall of
separation" mode, then it would have to come to terms with the inevi-
table meaning of separationism. In simple terms, separationism
means that the government should be comprehensively secular. This
does not only mean that religious oaths cannot be required of public
officials. It also means that government cannot incorporate the cur-
268 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
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rent religious majority's beliefs in its official symbols or use the gov-
ernment's many branches to advance a particular religious view of
the world. The government cannot announce that it rules a nation
"under God." Under a secular regime, government cannot require
its public school teachers to instruct students in the majority's faith,
and it cannot allow powerful religious groups to use public school fa-
cilities to proselytize unwary youngsters. Students in a public school
biology class cannot be taught that God created the world. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, government cannot take tax money-
even the modern equivalent of three pence 2 -from one group of be-
lievers (or nonbelievers) and finance the religious activities of others.
These conclusions are absolutist because the logic governing sec-
tarian and secular governance dictates that the two categories are
mutually exclusive. Those who oppose the secular approach should
open the Pandora's box of sectarian governance at their peril. Opti-
mistic proponents of weak sectarianism may hope that the strong sec-
tarians with whom they are presently allied will restrain themselves
from abusing the authority to impose their religious will-authority
that may very soon be granted by a newly configured Supreme Court.
But it is difficult to identify the historical or theological basis for this
belief in the religious majority's inclination to exercise self-restraint.
There is nothing in the logic of sectarian government that compels it,
and if the long, bloody history of religious governance is any guide,
there is no reason that the rest of us realistically should expect it.
269 See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, supra note 7, at 3,
reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. 65 (1947).
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